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Historic preservation laws matter. When Tom Ahern sought to reduce his
heating bills by replacing the wooden windows on his turn-of-the-century
Colonial Revival with vinyl windows in March 2004, he was merely following
in the footsteps of countless other frugal New England homeowners. Yet while
Ahern may have been a typical homeowner, his home -a triple-decker in New
Haven's historically working-class City Point neighborhood-was not a typical
home. Nearly four years earlier, in October 2000, City Point homeowners
voted overwhelmingly to approve an amendment to the New Haven zoning
bylaws designating City Point as a local historic district (LHD). Designed to
"preserve and protect the community's historic architecture and the quality of
life of the neighborhood,"' the LHD ordinance required that almost any
proposed external alteration of a structure in the LHD receive prior approval
from the New Haven Historic District Commission (HDC). Ahern decided not
to seek this approval, and when the Historic District Commission challenged
his vinyl windows, he decided to fight back. In the end, Ahern negotiated a
compromise: he could keep the side and rear vinyl windows, as long as he
reinstalled the wooden front windows and replaced the asphalt shingling on
the front of his house with wooden clapboard. Both sides claimed victory.
At first glance this incident may appear to be no more than a garden-variety
zoning dispute. Yet upon closer inspection, it illustrates two new challenges
facing historic preservation at the start of the twenty-first century. The first
challenge is how best to address the shift from historic preservation as an
individual activity to historic preservation as a more communal activity.
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, historic preservation
in the United States was a largely individualized affair, unencumbered by the
need for either consensus or negotiation. Individual owners maintained
individual properties, while the government used taxpayer money to maintain
obvious national landmarks This began to change in the 1950s and 196os, as
communities began to realize that they were losing their architectural heritage
because of individual or governmental decisions that frequently subordinated
historic preservation to desires for immediate profit or immediate
regeneration.' As the historic preservation movement has slowly expanded its
1. CITY POINT HISTORIc DIST. STUDY COMM., CITY OF NEW HAVEN, [REPORT] 1 (1999) (on file
with the New Haven City Plan Department) [hereinafter CITY POINT STUDY REPORT].
2. See NOR-MAN TYLER, HISTORIC PRESERVATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ITS HISTORY,
PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICE 33-36 (2000).
3. Although the National Trust for Historic Preservation was chartered by Congress in 1949, it
was not until the 195os and 196os that historic preservation began to find a broader base of
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emphasis from preserving grand homes and famous public buildings to
preserving the vernacular history of everyday American life, historic
preservation-once an individual activity-has become an increasingly
communal one.4
The second challenge is how best to address the shift in the focus of
historic preservation from landmark buildings to vernacular neighborhoods.
The increased emphasis over the past four decades on the creation of historic
districts has meant that ordinary homeowners have become more involved in a
debate about the value of historic preservation that previously concerned only a
small band of preservation-minded civic activists. While some of the first
historic preservation efforts in the United States came in the context of historic
districts,' not until the United States Conference of Mayors argued for the
broader use of LHDs in 1966 did many local preservationists consider
expanding their primary emphasis beyond protecting landmark buildings.6
The increased use of LHDs-which differ from National Register Historic
Districts (NRHDs) in that they carry legal obligations as well as symbolic
value -has meant that law and preservation have become more intertwined at
the local level than ever before. This growth has been steady and significant: in
1957 there were only 11 communities with local preservation ordinances,
whereas by 1975 there were 421 such communities, and by 1983 there were
adherents. See, e.g., Special Comm. on Historic Pres., U.S. Conference of Mayors, Findings
and Recommendations, in WITH HERITAGE So RICH 189 (Nat'l Trust for Historic Pres. ed.,
1983) (1966).
4. For example, the National Trust for Historic Preservation estimates that its Main Street
Program, focused on revitalizing American downtowns, has attracted public and private
investment of $23.3 billion and has created over 3o8,ooo new jobs since 198o. See NAT'L
TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES., ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 5 (2005), available at
http://www.nationaltrust.org/about/reports/2oo4-annual-reportnthp.pdf; see also GOV'T
FIN. RESEARCH CTR., GOV'T. FIN. OFFICERS ASS'N, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PRESERVING
COMMUNITY CHARACTER: A CASE STUDY FROM FREDERICKSBURG, VIRGINIA (Nat'l Trust for
Historic Pres., Dollars & Sense of Historic Pres. 005, 1996) (1991) (finding that home prices
in the Fredericksburg LHD -roughly equal to those outside the LHD when it was created in
the 1970s-were over 60% higher than those outside the LHD by 199o); S.C. DEP'T OF
ARCHIVES & HISTORY, HISTORIC DISTRICTS ARE GOOD FOR YOUR POCKETBOOK: THE IMPACT
OF LOCAL HISTORIC DISTRICTS ON HOUSE PRICES IN SOUTH CAROLINA (2OOO),
http://www.state.sc.us/scdah/propval.pdf (concluding that property values in historic
districts are higher, and increase at a higher rate, than those outside historic districts). For
an excellent comprehensive annotated bibliography of historic preservation literature, see
RANDALL MASON, ECONOMICS AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION: A GUIDE AND REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE 22-51 (2005), available at http://www.brookings.edu/metro/pubs/20050926-
preservation.pdf.
s. See TYLER, supra note 2, at 57-60.
6. Special Comm. on Historic Pres., supra note 3, at 193.
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between 8oo and 1OOO. 7 By 2002, there were over 2300 communities with local
preservation ordinances,8 and interest in creating new local preservation
ordinances continues to grow. While the first legal battles about preservation
were fought in the courts, resulting in landmark legal opinions such as Berman
v. Parker9 and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,"° today the
legal issues facing preservation are less high-profile, yet no less important.
Moreover, the historic preservation movement has begun to push beyond its
traditional focus on high architecture and Anglo-American history,'1 and it is
increasingly at the local level-in places like the "Little Manila" of Stockton,
California; 2 the experimental Depression-era community of Arthurdale, West
Virginia; 3 and the "iconic cultural landscape" of Hartington, Nebraska
(population 16oo)' 4 -where the future of the historic preservation movement
is developing.
Despite this increased emphasis on using LHDs to preserve otherwise
ordinary neighborhoods," almost all of the existing literature concerning
7. RiCHARD J. RODDEWIG, PREPARING A HISTOK-c PRESERVATION ORDINANCE 1 (Am. Planning
Ass'n, PAS Report No. 374, 1983), reprinted in Am. LAW INST.-AM. BAR Ass'N COMM. ON
CONTINUING PROF'L EDUC., ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: HISTORIC
PRESERVATION LAW 399, 399 (2004).
8. NAT'L TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRES., A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO PROTECTING HISTORIC PLACES:
LOCAL PRESERVATION ORDINANCES 1 (2002), http://www.nationaltrust.org/smartgrowth/
toolkit citizens.pdf.
9. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Berman upheld the right of governments to justify regulation and the
taking of private property for public purposes on the basis of aesthetics, noting in particular
that "[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents are
spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy .... Id.
at 33 (citation omitted).
10. 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (affirming that laws designating property as a historic landmark are a
valid exercise of the police power and do not constitute a per se regulatory taking of the
designated property).
11. See, e.g., Richard Cloues, Preserving the Legacy: Georgia's Historic African American Resources,
CRM, vol. 17, no. 2, 1994, at 17, available at http://crm.cr.nps.gov/archive/17-2/17-2-lo.pdf
(discussing the rapidly growing field of "minority preservation").
12. See Stephen Howie, It Has Come to This, PRESERVATION, Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 34.
13. See Michael Byers, Brave New Town, PRESERVATION, Mar.-Apr. 20o6, at 32.
14. Gillian Klucas, Up on the Farm, PRESERVATION, Nov.-Dec. 20o5, at 28, 29.
15. The term "ordinary neighborhood," as used in this Note, is in no way meant to carry any
pejorative connotation. Rather, the term is used simply as shorthand for a neighborhood
that, while architecturally or culturally rich in its own way, is not home to any of the
architectural or historical anomalies that have traditionally attracted the focus of historic
preservationists (such as landmark buildings, presidential birthplaces, or sites of nationally
significant social, political, or military events).
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LHDs addresses the "how to" rather than the "why do." Although there is
substantial information available on how to repair an old home, 6 there is a
dearth of widely disseminated empirical insight into why homeowners create
LHDs, whether homeowners' views about LHDs change over time, and
whether local historic preservation laws are effective in practice.'7 This Note
addresses that gap in the legal and policy literature, exploring these emerging
local issues in the context of how owner-occupiers in New Haven's City Point
Local Historic District view, negotiate, and manage their obligations under a
recently approved LHD ordinance.
Part I provides a brief background of the historic preservation movement in
the United States, explains the reasons for the focus on New Haven's City
Point LHD, and offers a short historical sketch of City Point itself. Parts II and
III draw upon original empirical research to determine the extent to which
legal policy instruments matter in the historic preservation context -examining
the owners' perceptions of their obligations under LHD ordinances, the
effectiveness of LHD enforcement mechanisms, and the extent to which
owners manage their LHD obligations without resorting to the mechanisms
provided by law. Part IV summarizes the main research findings and offers
several policy recommendations, describing how this research might assist
New Haven as well as other American cities.
I. HISTORIC PRESERVATION, LOCAL HISTORIC DISTRICTS, AND
CITY POINT
A. The Historic Preservation Movement and the Rise of the Local Historic
District
The historic preservation movement in the United States was born in ad
hoc campaigns during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to
16. See, e.g., N.Y. LANDMARKs CONSERVANCY, HISTORIC BUILDING FACADES: THE MANUAL FOR
MAINTENANCE AND REHABILITATION (William G. Foulks ed., 1997); TECHNICAL PRES.
SERVS., NAT'L PARK SERv., RESPECTFUL REHABILITATION: ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS
ABOUT OLD BUILDINGS (1982).
17. The existing empirical research on the effects of LHDs largely focuses on interpreting
impersonal data such as appraised values and census tract demographics. See, e.g., N.
Edward Coulson & Robin M. Leichenko, Historic Preservation and Neighbourhood Change, 41
URB. STUD. 1587 (2004) (using census data to determine that preservation efforts did not
appreciably change neighborhood demographics). Although such work is extremely
valuable, it is not-nor does it claim to be-designed for probing the motivations and
rationales of the individual owners who, together, compose the LHD and determine its
tenor, parameters, and relative success.
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preserve specific prominent sites or buildings that were under immediate
threat of demolition or development. (Famous examples included George
Washington's Mount Vernon 8 and the Gettysburg battlefield."9 ) This
approach began to change during the late 195os and early 196os, however, as
federal urban renewal programs encouraged the mass clearance of "blighted"
areas such as southwest Washington, D.C.,2" Boston's West End,2' and New
Haven's Oak Street." Historic preservationists responded to these wholesale
demolition programs by pushing for passage of legislation like the National
Historic Preservation Act of 196623 and by creating standing organizations
dedicated to preserving the historic built environment. Yet in their early years,
these organizations, like the preceding campaigns, focused largely on the
preservation of significant public and quasi-public buildings located in or near
renewal zones, and the tools at their disposal were largely extralegal -
consisting predominantly of persuasion, publicity campaigns, small
"encouragement" grants, and the "plaquing" of historic buildings. 4
With the passage of the National Historic Preservation Act and the
subsequent Supreme Court decision in Penn Central,5 historic preservationists
gradually acquired legal tools for their arsenal. These tools now range from
demolition delay ordinances, LHDs, and the granting of preservation
easements, to preservation tax credits, faqade improvement programs, and
adaptive reuse policies. 6 Despite the availability of these tools, the historic
preservation movement has traditionally relied upon voluntary compliance and
18. See ELSWYTH THANE, MOUNT VERNON: THE LEGACY 1 (1967).
19. See United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 16o U.S. 668, 670 (1896).
20. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
21. See THOMAS H. O'CONNOR, BUILDING A NEW BOSTON: POLITICS AND URBAN RENEWAL
1950-1970, at 125-39 (1993).
22. See Ira M. Leonard, The Rise of Metropolitan New Haven, 186o to 198o, in NEW HAVEN: AN
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 45, 6o-6i (Floyd Shumway & Richard Hegel eds., 1981).
23. Pub. L. No. 89-665, 8o Stat. 915 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 to 47ox-6
(2000)).
24. Michael A. Candeto, Historic Preservation in the Elm City: The Role of the New Haven
Preservation Trust 25-31 (May 29, 1979) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law
School Library).
2S. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
26. See infra note 31; see also, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-147j (2005) (authorizing demolition
delay ordinances); STEVEN TIESDELL ET AL., REVITALIZING HISTORIC URBAN QUARTERS
(1996) (discussing adaptive reuse); Nat'l Trust for Historic Pres., Preservation Easements:
An Important Legal Tool for the Preservation of Historic Places,
http://www.nationaltrust.org/legaVeasements/index.html (last visited Nov. 29, 20o6)
(discussing preservation easements).
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affirmative incentives instead of legally binding mandates. For example, in the
early years of the historic preservation movement, legal solutions like "historic
districting" tended to be employed only in small areas of undeniable historical
or architectural importance (such as downtown Charleston, South Carolina, or
New Orleans's Vieux Carr6), where the overriding value of external legal
controls was understandable, if not always enthusiastically received by local
owners.27
As the nation has aged, however, more neighborhoods have become
21
candidates for LHD status and the legal obligations that such status imposes.
The number of LHDs has increased steadily over the past forty years and
continues to grow at a record pace. 9 Yet for these newer LHDs, the
justifications for such a designation can be less clear-cut than were the
justifications for more obvious candidates like New York City's Greenwich
Village, where there was significant public support for preserving the
architecturally popular brownstone aesthetic. As the historic preservation
community has begun to focus less on monumental public architecture and
spectacular private mansions, and more on the importance of preserving both
the "folk" architectural vernacular and "collections" of buildings (such as
streetscapes or neighborhoods), many local communities that may not have
considered themselves historic now find themselves prime candidates for
historic district designation.
Any process of deciding whether to implement new property regulations
inevitably creates friction, as local property owners face a fundamental legal
question: whether they are willing to relinquish partial control over their own
property in exchange for a modicum of control over the property of their
neighbors. The decision about whether to pursue LHD status raises the same
questions but also makes a unique additional demand of the homeowners
involved: to navigate a course between protecting American heritage and
pursuing the American dream.
27. See TYLER, supra note 2, at 59-60. Moreover, until Berman, the validity of aesthetic
regulation was highly unsettled, and attempts to implement aesthetic regulations were
frequently struck down by state courts. Id.
28. Usually a historic site, landmark, or district must be at least fifty years old before it can be
considered for listing on the National Register of Historic Places. See Nat'l Register of
Historic Places, Nat'l Park Serv., Listing a Property: Some Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.cr.nps.gov/nrAisting.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2006). Additionally, "[i]n many
communities, the creation of a National Register district is the trigger for [creating] a
parallel local [historic] district." Donovan D. Rypkema, The Economic Effect of National
Register Listing, CRM, vol. 17, no. 2, 1994, at 28, 29, available at http://crm.cr.nps.gov/
archive/17-2/17-2-16.pdf.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8.
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B. Historic Preservation in New Haven
New Haven is an ideal subject for historic preservation studies for three
main reasons. First, New Haven's institutional preservation ethic arose at a
comparatively early point, with the 1962 founding of the New Haven
Preservation Trust (NHPT)3 ° predating both the passage of the National
Historic Preservation Act (1966) and the Penn Central decision (1978). The
preservation community in New Haven has therefore had more time to
develop its public policy preservation tools than have its counterparts in many
other cities.3" Second, the presence of Yale University, with its broad
architectural portfolio, has spurred New Haven to engage in a comprehensive
evaluation of potential historic preservation strategies.32 Third, New Haven's
characteristics as a mid-sized postindustrial city mirror those of many other
cities that are attempting to balance their historic built environment with the
needs of their contemporary citizenry.33 Understanding the effects of LHDs in
New Haven therefore provides insight into issues facing similar districts
elsewhere in New England and across the country.
New Haven has seventeen National Register Historic Districts, as well as
thirty-two properties or sites that are listed individually on the National
Register.34 New Haven also has three LHDs: Wooster Square (1970),
Quinnipiac River (1978), and City Point (2001). Under the New Haven
historic preservation ordinance,3" homeowners residing in these districts must
preserve their property as it was at the time the LHD was created, and they
must receive approval from the New Haven Historic District Commission
30. See PEGGY FLINT, THE NEW HAVEN PRESERVATION TRUST, A TEN YEARS' WAR, 1962-1972
(1972).
31. These tools include local and national historic districts, see CITY OF NEW HAVEN, NEW
RAVEN DATA BOOK 63 (2002) [hereinafter DATA BOOK], available at
http ://www.cityofnewhaven.com/CityPlan/pdfs/PlanningPrograms/ComprehensivePlarVData
_Book.htm, home painting incentives, see David McClendon, City Grants To Create Jobs,
Beautify Homes, NEW HAVEN REG., May 16, 1997, at A5, faqade improvement programs, see
Tara York, Grand Ave. Bakery Celebrates Face-Lift, NEW HAVEN REG., Oct. 21, 2003, at A3,
and state tax credits, see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-416.
32. See, e.g., VINCENT SCULLY ET AL., YALE IN NEW HAVEN: ARCHITECTURE & URBANISM (2004).
33. Such cities include New London, Connecticut; Worcester, Massachusetts; Manchester, New
Hampshire; and Providence, Rhode Island.
34. DATA BOOK, supra note 31, at 63.
35. NEW HAVEN, CONN., ZONING ORDINANCE art. VI, § 54 (20o6), available at
http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp ?pid= 19969&sid= 7 .
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before making any changes to their homes that are not like-for-like. 6 The
HDC consists of five members and up to five alternates,37 holds monthly public
meetings, and has two main duties. The first is to assist in identifying historic
resources in New Haven that are worthy of or in need of preservation. 8 The
second is to review owner applications for "certificates of appropriateness,"
which are required whenever an owner in an LHD seeks to erect, alter, restore,
move, or demolish any building or structure or any exterior architectural
feature that is visible from a public way.39 In making this determination, the
HDC uses statutory guidelines for determining appropriateness (including
factors such as the historical and architectural significance of the building, the
materials and design of the proposed alteration, and the relationship of the
change to "other structures in the immediate neighborhood"), and it may deny
a certificate of appropriateness if the changes, "in the opinion of the
Commission, would be detrimental to the interest of the historic district."4"
Finally, the HDC has at least nominal enforcement authority4' and is
empowered both to issue stop-work orders (thereby ensuring that historic
features are not destroyed before a public hearing can be held) 42 and to fine
owners who violate LHD regulations. 43
C. The City Point Neighborhood as a Case Study
The purpose of an academic case study is to examine a single incident with
the intention of generalizing the findings in order to construct a general theory
36. Id. § 54(g)-(i). Under a like-for-like policy, replacing one vinyl window with another vinyl
window would not require HDC approval. However, replacing a wooden window with a
vinyl window would require HDC approval.
37. Id. § 54(e)(2)(a). All HDC members are appointed by the Mayor. The HDC must include at
least one architect or architectural historian, one member selected from a list of candidates
provided by the New Haven Preservation Trust, and at least one resident or owner from
each LHD.
38. DATA BOOK, supra note 31, at 63.
39. ZONING ORDINANCE art. VI, § 54 (f)(1)-(2). The New Haven ordinance does not apply to
alterations made solely to interiors. Id. § 54 (i).
40. Id. S 54(g).
41. Id. S 54(1). For a discussion of how effective this enforcement authority is in practice, see
infra Section III.C.
4z. ZONING ORDINANCE art. VI, S 54(l)(1).
43. Id. 7 54(l)(3).
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for why the world works in a certain way. 44 Two features of the City Point
LHD make it an ideal candidate for a case study.
Figure 1.
MAP OF CITY POINT NEIGHBORHOOD
45
First, the City Point LHD was created recently, in 2001. Conducting this
research while the City Point LHD is relatively new offers a baseline for future
researchers, who will have the opportunity to reassess the LHD and to provide
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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a valuable longitudinal complement to the empirical data presented herein.
Many owners who voted for the LHD still reside there, providing an
opportunity to explore how closely their expectations when forming the LHD
align with the reality of their experience four years later. Moreover, New
Haven has a long history of historic preservation and has created institutions
(notably the Historic District Commission) that have established procedures
for how LHDs "should" operate. This provides an opportunity to compare the
initial experiences of the City Point LHD to the settled policy norm.
Second, the particular features of the City Point neighborhood itself make
it a useful ground for wider comparison. Because this LHD was formed around
an ordinary neighborhood, it provides an opportunity to examine the unique
policy issues that may be present in LHDs that do not have any immediately
obvious historic focal point. The LHD is compact enough to permit a thorough
survey of its owners, while still providing enough variety in housing stock,
housing quality, social class, and other variables to make the research
conclusions broadly applicable. Furthermore, in both New Haven and many
cities nationwide, HDCs are responsible for multiple LHDs - each of which has
its own socioeconomic, aesthetic, and geographic profile. The experience of the
New Haven HDC in balancing its obligations to City Point and other LHDs
provides insight into how other cities might structure their own historic
preservation efforts.
In order to evaluate the dynamics of the current City Point LHD, it is
important to understand City Point's historical evolution. Positioned just
southwest of New Haven's historic city center, on a long spit of land stretching
into the harbor, the City Point neighborhood was first developed in the mid-
nineteenth century, coinciding with the emergence of a thriving commercial
oystering industry.46 Many of the houses on South Water Street date from
around 1850, with stilted upper levels and double-width doors on the ground
levels designed for the easy unloading of the oysters that were harvested just
offshore.47 Although the oystering industry had reached its peak by the end of
the nineteenth century,48 rapid industrialization led City Point to become one
of New Haven's first "streetcar suburbs." The presence of a streetcar line on
Howard Avenue by 1893 fostered a development boom of larger homes on the
46. SeeVIRGINIAM. GALPIN, NEW HAVEN'S OYSTERINDUSTRY 1638-1987, at 23 (1989).
47. See, e.g., New Haven Pres. Trust & Conn. Historical Comm'n, New Haven Historic
Resources Inventory Phase One: Central New Haven 9-1o (Jan. 1982) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the New Haven Museum and Historical Society).
48. Trevor O'Neill, Oystering and Oyster Law in Connecticut 6 (Dec. 30, 1981) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the New Haven Museum and Historical Society).
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main thoroughfare and more modest homes along cross and side streets.4 9 The
last buildings in City Point were built around 1925, as available land quickly
became scarce. The result of this nearly ninety-year development is a fine
collection of architectural styles, ranging from vernacular oystermen's houses,
Greek Revivals, and Eastern Stick Styles to Queen Annes, Italianates, and
Bungalows, all of which have been remarkably well preserved in a compact
neighborhood of six streets and approximately one hundred houses.
Between the end of World War II and the late 198os, however, City Point
experienced a period of stagnation, as the oystering business declined," the
automobile allowed more affluent families to abandon the "streetcar suburbs,"
and New Haven slowly lost its status as a major manufacturing center. As the
oystering families moved out of City Point, they were replaced by immigrant
and ethnic minority families seeking inexpensive housing in the Howard
Avenue homes that were being converted into duplexes and apartments."1
Then, in the late 1950s, the construction of Interstate 95 physically divided the
City Point neighborhood from the Hill neighborhood to its north, a
demoralizing blow that further isolated the peninsula of City Point from the
rest of the city. 2
The number of absentee landlords in City Point also increased during this
period, and the "appearance of the neighborhood began to deteriorate." 3
Although middle-class "urban homesteaders" stemmed this trend temporarily
49. The NHPT Historic Resources Inventory notes that "[h]ouses constructed during [this]
period along the cross streets and Greenwich Avenue in City Point are ...more modest
versions of styles and types of contemporary residences along Howard Avenue." New Haven
Pres. Trust, supra note 47, at ii.
50. See GALPIN, supra note 46, at 34; Stephen W. Hitchcock, The Last of the New Haven
Oysternen .... YANKEE MAG., Oct. 1972, at 66.
51. See New Haven Pres. Trust, supra note 47, at 12.
52. Ironically, the construction of Interstate 95 may have been what ultimately preserved "the
flavor and character of this small, unique New Haven neighborhood." HENRY S. HARRISON,
HARRISON'S ILLUSTRATED GUIDE: GREATER NEW HAVEN 190 (1995). As the New Haven
Preservation Trust noted,
[T]he highway construction, which isolated the district from the rest of the city
... helped to produce an undisturbed cohesive residential enclave, which has a
readily identifiable historic character. The streetscape appears today much as it
did at the turn of the century, when most of the buildings in the district were
completed.
New Haven Pres. Trust, The Oyster Point Historic District, http://web.archive.org/web/
20041226oo833/www.icomm.ca/nhpt/HistoricDistrictPages/oysterpoint.html (cached
Feb. 15, 2005).
53. New Haven Pres. Trust, slpra note 47, at 12.
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during the 197os, s4 concerns about crime5" and neighborhood stability
continued to strain City Point's relationship with the Hill neighborhood to its
north from the late 197oS, 6 into the 199os.17 Despite these tensions, however,
there were also glimmers of hope for City Point. By the early 198os, the
neighborhood was beginning to welcome a number of younger families who
were "attracted to the area for its beautiful old homes, waterside location,
continuity as a neighborhood, and... increasing ethnic diversity. ' 8 Almost
twenty years later, these positive factors helped spur the creation of the City
Point LHD.
D. The Impetus for the City Point Local Historic District
Before turning to the empirical study, it is important to understand why
City Point's homeowners sought LHD status in the first place. The first step in
City Point's journey toward LHD status was its designation as a National
Register Historic District in 1989. As part of the New Haven Preservation
Trust's effort to inventory every historic structure in the city, the Trust noted
that the "earliest oystermen's houses, along South Water Street[,] . .. bear an
historical link with later, larger, and generally more intact houses of the local
industry's leaders along Howard Avenue." The Trust successfully petitioned
for NRHD status on the basis that these structures composed "part of a local
thematic district based on the history of the industry in the area." 9 This
designation was largely symbolic, however, because NRHD status is
enforceable only against the federal government (for example, if federal money
is used for highway construction or if a private construction project necessitates
54. See id. at 13.
s. Historical New Haven Digital Collection, "I Feel Safe in My Neighborhood" (c. 1994),
http://insight.library.yale.edu/Yaleimages/Size3/YVRC/D4164/2 579o3.jpg.
56. SHosHANAHoosE, CITY POINT 13 (1980).
s. The tensions noted by Shoshana Hoose, id., were exacerbated in the 198os and early 199os
by stark demographic contrasts between the two geographically proximate neighborhoods;
compared to the Hill, City Point had fewer minorities, see Historical New Haven Digital
Collection, Black-White Racial Composition of Each City Block in New Haven (199o),
http://insight.library.yale.edu/Yaleimages/Size3/YVRC/D4165/257823.jpg, fewer vacant
structures, see CITY OF NEW HAVEN, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF DEVELOPMENT: NEW HAVEN,
CONNECTICUT, at IV.6 (2003), available at http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/ciryplan/
planningprograms.asp, and fewer Section 8 housing voucher recipients, cf DATA BOOK,
supra note 31, at 33 (providing data for 2000).
58. HOOSE, supra note 56, at 13.
59. New Haven Pres. Trust, supra note 47, at 14.
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an Army Corps permit); homeowners in an NRHD are not restricted in any
way in the use of their property.6 0
In June 1996, however, City Point residents met to discuss forming a local
historic district with legally binding effect under the New Haven zoning
66,
ordinancel-a process that was eventually completed in February 2001.
Three main catalysts appear to have sustained the momentum of the LHD
proposal: the proposed widening of Interstate 95, the demolition of St. Peter's
Church in the adjoining Hill neighborhood, and the potential encroachment of
an upscale condominium development on the South Water Street waterfront.
The first catalyst came in the early 199os, when it became apparent that
Interstate 95 was no longer capable of carrying an ever-increasing volume of
traffic. Proposals for easing this congestion included widening the highway-
which would entail taking several City Point houses-and creating new
roundabouts within City Point itself. Having already suffered amputation from
the rest of the Hill neighborhood with the construction of Interstate 95, City
Point residents were fearful of further highway incursions. As such, they
sought every available tool in their fight against the widening, including LHD
status. 6' Notably, the existence of the LHD would not likely provide direct
substantive protection against such a widening; because City Point had
previously been designated an NRHD, any federally funded project-such as
the expansion of an interstate highway -would already be required to meet the
6o. See National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 § io6, 16 U.S.C. § 47of (2000). For an
excellent overview of the implications of NRHD designation, the types of federal action that
"trigger" the Act, and the section 1o6 review process, see JULIA H. MILLER, A LAYPERSON'S
GUIDE TO HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW: A SURVEY OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL LAws
GOVERNING HISTORIC RESOURCE PROTECTION 1-8 (2000).
61. NEW HAVEN, CONN., ZONING ORDINANCE art. VI, § 54 (2oo6), available at
http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp ?pid= 19 96 9 &sid=7.
62. LHD ordinances provide significantly stronger protection than does NRHD status because
homeowners are legally bound under the former in a way that they are not under the latter.
The LHD process is fully explained in CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-147b(a-j) (2005). See also supra
Section I.B. The process of creating an LHD consists of four distinct stages. First, the HDC
issues a study report outlining the rationale for forming a new district, holds a public
hearing, and recommends whether or not the proposed district warrants a vote. Second,
two-thirds of property owners in the proposed district must vote (by secret ballot) to accept
the LHD restrictions. Third, a majority of the Board of Aldermen must vote to approve the
LHD. Finally, the Mayor must sign the LHD into law. For City Point, the study of the
proposed district began in June 1996, the owner vote took place in October 2000, the
Aldermen approved the district on January 16, 2001, and Mayor John DeStefano signed the
district into law on February 20, 2001. See CITY POINT STUDY REPORT, supra note 1.
63. For an explanation of how such tools might be deployed, see Andrea C. Ferster & Elizabeth
S. Merritt, Legal Tools for Fighting Freeways and Saving Historic Roads, F.J., Summer 2000, at
32, available at http://www.nationaltrust.org/issues/transportation/iegal-tools.pdf.
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stringent historic preservation standards of section 4 (f) of the Department of
Transportation Act.64 However, the existence of an LHD could potentially
provide residents with additional legal tools if either the state or the city
became involved in the process-for example, if additional state-level
environmental permits were required, or if the viability of the federal
component relied upon secondary components (such as new access roads or
alignments) that were state- or city-owned.
The second catalyst was the 20oo demolition of St. Peter's Roman Catholic
Church on Kimberley Avenue. Deconsecrated in 1996, St. Peter's was a 1903
Richardsonian Romanesque landmark in the Hill neighborhood, built by Irish
immigrants several blocks north of City Point itself.6 When the city embarked
upon an ambitious school construction and renewal initiative in the mid-
1990s, however, it designated St. Peter's as the site for a new elementary
school. Despite being listed on the state and national registers of historic
places, 66 and despite well-organized protests against its demolition (including
a petition signed by 8oo residents and a court battle between the local
residents' association and the city), 6, the city ultimately tore down St. Peter's
only hours after the superior court ruling.68 This experience appears to have
galvanized the resolve of those who were already pushing for a City Point
LHD; they argued that if state and national register listings were unable to save
St. Peter's, such listings might not protect the City Point community either. 6
64. 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2000).
65. HOOSE, supra note 56, at 2.
66. All states have registers of historic places, which often afford listed sites certain protections
from state action (analogous to the protections that the National Historic Preservation Act
affords to listed sites that are potentially affected by federal action). Listing on a state
register also often makes a site eligible for certain state-based financial rehabilitation
incentives. For an overview of the role of state registers, see MILLER, supra note 60, at 9. For
an overview of state preservation law, see Sandra G. McLamb, Preservation Law Survey 20o1:
State Preservation Law, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 463 (2002).
67. For a report on the petition, see Robert J. Leeney, Old Friends Trying To Preserve St. Peter's in
Hill, NEW HAVEN REG., Apr. 29, 2000, at A8. For information about the lawsuit, see
Hill/City Point Neighborhood Action Group v. City of New Haven, No. CVooo4 37784 ,
2ooo WL 1172327 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 21, 2000). The plaintiff group alleged that the city
had not pursued feasible and rational alternatives to demolition as required under the
National Historic Preservation Act. Id. at *1.
68. Natalie Missakian, City Wins Court Battle, St. Peter's Demolished, NEw HAVEN REG., May 24,
2000, at Ai.
69. See id. ("Doris Groves, a 7o-year resident of [City Point], said even though [the] neighbors
lost in court, they won by coming together and rallying around a cause. 'I think it shows
that the neighborhood has to get involved and they have to be informed,' Groves said.").
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The final catalyst was the potential incursion of more high-end
condominiums in the City Point neighborhood. In 1981, taking advantage of
City Point's waterfront location and proximity to Interstate 95, a developer
constructed a gated planned development of approximately 300 condos at the
west end of South Water Street, demolishing several homes in the process. 70
While City Point residents grudgingly accommodated this development, the
perpetual threat of further condo development on adjacent vacant marshland
generated sustained concern among local homeowners. In particular, many
homeowners feared that additional condo development would be out of scale
with the existing neighborhood, would increase traffic, and would decrease
surrounding property values.7' While the LHD boundaries did not encompass
the proposed condo expansion site, the LHD still provided an additional legal
tool that could assist City Point residents in their fight against future
development threats. Perhaps more importantly, the LHD had value as a
symbolic statement to potential developers that City Point residents were
prepared to mount a unified opposition campaign should any incompatible
development be proposed.
II. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: OWNER PERCEPTIONS OF THE LHD
This Part presents empirical data about owner-occupier views of the LHD.
The data were collected in two ways: through a quantitative written survey of
all City Point owner-occupiers and through qualitative interviews with a
smaller number of City Point owner-occupiers.72 The quantitative survey was
designed and conducted according to methods proven to obtain significantly
70. HARRISON, supra note 52, at 19o.
71. Indeed, in 2004, another developer did propose constructing eighty-two additional condos,
to be located immediately behind the existing older homes on the west side of lower
Howard Avenue. See Randall Beach, Condo Expansion Draws Ire from Neighbors, NEW HAVEN
REG., July 6, 2004, at Ai.
72. See infra note 94 for additional details about the survey sample population. This study was
intentionally limited to owner-occupiers (approximately 70% of the residential owners in
the City Point LHD) and did not include absentee owners, because the main research issues
of interest concerned how neighbors dealt with one another in managing their obligations
under the LHD. Absentee owners were presumed to be much more likely to comply with the
statutory HDC regulations not only to avoid institutional conflicts with the city, but also
because they would not have accumulated the social capital among owner-occupiers that
might help them avoid being reported to the HDC for violations. See infra Section III.B.
Indeed, many of the absentee-owned buildings in the neighborhood sported the $75 "City
Point Historic District" plaque, suggesting that absentee owners were generally inclined to
support the district and to comply voluntarily with the letter of the law.
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higher-than-average response rates.73 Indeed, the survey response rate was
approximately 73%, which provides a high level of confidence in the
representativeness of the results. The survey results were then coded and
entered into an SPSS file74 and were supplemented with data from the New
Haven Assessor's database. 7' Finally, in-person qualitative interviews were
conducted with approximately 20% of the survey respondents. 76  This
qualitative component enabled the collection of information that would have
been impossible to acquire via a written survey, and it provided a parallel
source of data against which to compare the quantitative survey results.
A. Overall Owner Perceptions
Owners were generally favorable in their perceptions of the LHD; most had
supported its creation in 2ool, and a significant number felt that its advantages
continued to outweigh its disadvantages. Turning first to overall perceptions
73. The quantitative survey and its delivery method were constructed using the techniques set
forth in DON A. DULMAN, MAIL AND INTERNET SURVEYS: THE TAILORED DESIGN METHOD
(2d ed. 2000). Each owner-occupier was solicited in person and provided with a thirty-five
question, two-page questionnaire. The questionnaire, available at http://www.
yalelawjournal.org/abstract.asp?id=63o, included fifteen yes/no questions and twenty
interval questions (using a scale of one through five). Respondents were provided with
prestamped return envelopes; those who did not return a survey were contacted again by
phone, and then by personalized letter.
74. This data file is available in both SPSS and Excel formats at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/
abstract.asp?id=63o. After executing Mann-Whitney U tests on the five-interval data sets to
determine statistical significance, the five-interval data sets were collapsed into three
intervals. (To illustrate, if "one" indicated "strongly oppose" and "five" indicated "strongly
support," the data were collapsed so that a response of "one" or "two" indicated "oppose," a
response of "three" indicated "neutral," and a response of "four" or "five" indicated
"support.") This method made general trends easier to identify, while still preserving the
original full gradation differences for future analyses.
75. Vision Appraisal Tech., Assessors Online Database for New Haven, CT,
http://data.visionappraisal.con/newhavenct (last visited Nov. 29, 2006). The additional
factual data for each property included house location, appraised value, square footage,
purchase year (and price, if available), and acreage.
76. All quotations from City Point residents cited in this Note are drawn from fifteen informal
in-person interviews conducted in City Point between September 12, 2004, and November
21, 2004. Two particular steps were taken to encourage candor. First, residents were
promised that any printed citation of their comments would be suitably anonymized; this
Note honors this promise by referring to each respondent only by his or her street of
residence. Second, interviews were not tape-recorded to avoid causing interviewees to be
more guarded in their responses. Instead, during each interview, the author took
handwritten notes, which were transcribed immediately thereafter. The transcriptions are
on file with the author.
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and the creation of the City Point LHD, 6o% of survey respondents stated that
they had been supportive or strongly supportive of the creation of the LHD at
the time of the vote (in 2000), 33% stated that they had not been passionate
either way, and only 8% of respondents said that they had opposed the creation
of the LHD (N=4o)7 7-a somewhat unsurprising finding, considering that the
recorded vote was fifty-eight in favor and six opposed. 8 When asked about
their current views of the LHD, owners were still quite supportive, with a
significant majority believing that the advantages of the LHD outweighed its
disadvantages (8o% to 20%, N=49).79 Furthermore, of those respondents who
were also landlords (either of a unit in their own home or of another residential
structure in the LHD), 44% stated that they had found being in an LHD to be
an advantage in attracting tenants, while 5o% were not sure, and only 6% felt it
was a disadvantage (N=18). Interestingly, however, only a plurality of
respondents (41%) said that they were currently more in favor of the LHD than
they had been at the time of the vote (or, in the case of new residents,
compared to when they first moved into City Point), while 35% were neutral
and 24% were less in favor (N= 51).
Together, these findings suggest that although there were a number of
growing pains between the time the LHD was founded in 2001 and the time
this study was conducted in 2004, most owners had some reason to believe
that, on balance, the LHD has provided actual benefits to the neighborhood.
These benefits are not necessarily tangible or financial, although 73% of
respondents felt that the LHD had increased their home value (N= 5 1), and 82%
reported that they were happy with the effect that the LHD had had on their
home values (N=44). Almost every proponent of the LHD who was
interviewed mentioned "stability" as the primary benefit of the LHD. This was
certainly evident from the survey, as 55% of respondents believed that without
the LHD, quality of life in City Point would be worse ten years hence, whereas
77. Percentages based on survey results may not total ioo% due to rounding. The specific 2004
data analyzed in this study are contained in the Excel data file available at
http ://www.yalelawjournal.org/abstract.asp?id= 630.
78. William Kaempffer, Voters OK City Point Historic Area, NEW HAVEN REG., Oct. 16, 2000, at
A3. However, it is not clear from the official vote how many of the owners who voted in
favor were absentee landlords-and as noted supra note 72, there is anecdotal evidence
suggesting that absentee landlords may have been disproportionately active supporters in
the vote.
79. The one statistically significant departure from the overall result on this point was between
respondents living on the "middle-class" streets (Howard, Sea, and South Water) and those
living on the "working-class" streets (Greenwich, Hallock, and Sixth). Of the former, 88%
thought the advantages of the district outweighed the disadvantages, while only 60% of the
latter felt the same way (NMcs=34, Nwcs=15, chi-square = 5.1, p < .05). The tension between
respondents on different streets is discussed more thoroughly infra Section II.C.
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only 18% believed quality of life would be better in the absence of an LHD
(N=49). One Sea Street owner echoed a sentiment common among
respondents: "I've lived here since 199o, and then the neighborhood was going
downhill. There was crime; people didn't seem to care about the place. But the
[local] historic district has helped, because now people take care of their houses
in a way that they didn't before."
The most interesting paradox arising from such qualitative responses is
that very few owners regarded "historic preservation" as the primary
advantage-or even the primary rationale-for the creation of the historic
district. While almost all LHD supporters noted that the LHD had increased
neighborhood stability (by encouraging owners to invest in their properties),
the fact that the LHD preserved the City Point neighborhood as a "historic"
architectural composite was almost never mentioned. 8° Indeed, despite the fact
that the median construction date for a home in City Point was 189o, only 38%
of respondents who bought their homes prior to creation of the LHD (N=37)
and 22% of those who bought their homes after creation of the LHD (N=9)
said that the "historic" nature of their home was a factor in their decision to
purchase.8' Moreover, several owners mentioned orally while completing the
survey that "my home wasn't historic when I bought it" - clearly drawing a
direct (if overly simplistic) connection between the passage of the LHD
ordinance and the instantaneous conversion of their homes from "nonhistoric"
to "historic" status.
Finally, this study found that a substantial minority of respondents (35%,
N=4 9 ) felt that the LHD was valuable in making neighbors take better care of
their homes yet was relatively ineffective in changing the ways that these
80. One possibility is that the community members were seeking "neighborhood preservation"
rather than "historic preservation," and that they may have been equally well served by
pursuing the increasingly popular "neighborhood conservation district." For an
introduction to the differences between LHDs and neighborhood conservation districts, see
JULIA MILLER, PROTECTING OLDER NEIGHBORHOODS THROUGH CONSERVATION DISTRICT
PROGRAMS 2-5 (2004).
81. Two categories of respondents showed statistically significant differences from this overall
result. For those living on "middle-class" streets, 52% said that the historic nature of their
home was a positive factor, compared to only 8% of those on "working-class" streets
(NMcs=25, Nwcs=12, chi-square = 6.9, p < .o5). See infra Section II.C and note 94 for
definitions and discussion of these concepts. Additionally, 8o% of young homeowners
(classified as those age thirty-nine and under) said that the historic nature of their home was
a positive factor in their purchase decision, and none said it was a negative factor-figures
that are striking compared to the 31% of middle-aged and older homeowners who saw this
factor as positive and the 9% of that same group who saw this factor as negative (NY=5,
Nm+o=32, Mann-Whitney z = -2.0, p < .o5). See infra note 90 for a definition of the age
cohorts used in this Note.
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respondents themselves took care of their own homes. These respondents
appeared to believe that the primary value of the LHD was preventative
(keeping others from undermining the status quo), rather than aspirational
(encouraging all members of the community to comply with a generally
agreed-upon standard). There are several ways to explain this apparent belief
in the need for laws for others but not for oneself. For example, several
respondents suggested that they already had a significant interest in
maintaining their homes prior to the introduction of the LHD, and that the
LHD did not force them to do anything that they would not have done
otherwise. As one survey respondent noted, "We are responsible neighbors and
committed to keeping this balance in our community." In addition, some
owners did not automatically associate meeting the LHD requirements with
"improvement." As one South Water Street owner stated, "There are plenty of
important things like making your home safe, livable, weather-tight-all of
those are important for taking better care of your home, but sometimes they
conflict with the HDC because the best solutions aren't necessarily historic
ones."
B. The Influence of Information
This study also found that despite significant support for the LHD in
general, many owners had incomplete information about their own specific
LHD obligations. For instance, there was a surprising discrepancy between the
percentage of owners reporting that they favored the creation of the LHD
(6o%, N=4o) and the amount of information about LHD regulations that
owners felt they had at the time of the vote, with many owners suggesting that
they wished they had more information about the LHD prior to its creation.
Only 34% of all respondents stated that they had enough information about the
advantages and disadvantages of LHD status at the time of the vote, while 24%
of all respondents complained that they did not have enough information
(N=41). Indeed, individual survey respondents consistently rated their support
for creating the LHD higher than their level of information about its potential
effects. Furthermore, a majority of respondents (56%, N=36) reported that
they did not believe that the level of information they received was sufficient -
including a large minority of owners who actually favored the creation of the
district (38%, N=21).
This discrepancy is potentially explainable because the strongest push for
creating the LHD came at the same time that residents were increasingly
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concerned about the proposed widening of Interstate 95 .82 Community
residents therefore embraced the LHD partially for its value as an ad hoc
defensive tool with which to fight the highway expansion. In their eagerness to
acquire such a short-term legal shield, however, it appears that at least some
residents were less than thorough in acquiring information about the long-
term implications that LHD status would have on their own homeownership
obligations. Furthermore, this research found that few owners rectified their
lack of knowledge regarding LHD obligations in the intervening years. Owners
consistently complained that they had received little or no information
regarding their obligations as owners in an LHD; the survey data revealed that
47% reported knowing "very little" about what the LHD required of them as
homeowners, while 20% reported knowing only a moderate amount (N=51).83
As one Sea Street resident lamented:
[One] problem is that after we became a local historic district, we
thought that we'd get the regulations from the City about what
procedures we needed to follow. But we never received anything, which
meant that all kinds of rumors were going around about how you
couldn't repair your house, or replace your windows, or paint, or do
anything - and that just wasn't true.
Moreover, a strikingly high 59% of respondents (N=51) reported that they
did not know about the federal and state historic rehabilitation tax credits
available to property owners in national and local historic districts - credits that
can be worth several thousand dollars. Of those who did know about the
credits, only lo% (N=21) had taken advantage of them.84 And perhaps most
surprisingly, of the respondent owners who moved into City Point after the
passage of the ordinance, approximately half (44%, N=9) reported not even
knowing that they had purchased a house in an LHD.
Coupled with the relative lack of sufficient information received prior to the
passage of the ordinance, this vacuum of definitive official information about
82. See supra Section I.D.
83. The only statistically significant difference between respondents was on the variable of their
street of residence. Indeed, 42% of respondents on "middle-class" streets reported having
significant knowledge of what the LHD required of them, as opposed to only 13% of
respondents on the "working-class" streets (NMcs=36 , Nwcs=15, Mann-Whitney z = -2.0, p
< .05). See infra Section II.C and note 94 for definitions and discussion of these concepts.
84. The federal program offers tax credits for up to 20% of rehabilitation costs for eligible
buildings. Historic Preservation Certifications, 36 C.F.R. § 67 (2005). The Connecticut
Historic Homes Rehabilitation Tax Credit Program offers tax credits for up to 30% of
eligible rehabilitation costs. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1O- 4 16(b) (Supp. 2006).
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the LHD appears to have become a recipe for confusion and opportunism.
Most confused owners genuinely wished to follow the law, but their lack of
information about their obligations placed them at a disadvantage relative to
their informed neighbors. 8' For example, owners who recognized the
implications of the LHD moved quickly to make improvements that would be
"grandfathered in" when the ordinance became effective; 86 13% of owners
(N=48) reported having done So.87 Those who did not realize the implications
of the LHD- but who would have undertaken similar improvements had they
known-could only pursue such improvements after undergoing an HDC
review or, in the case of improvements like vinyl siding, were foreclosed from
pursuing some options at all. These owners are certainly included in the 40%
of respondents (N=50) who reported that they had avoided engaging in certain
maintenance or renovation projects due solely to the existence of the LHD
regulations.
In the absence of official information, some owners who were displeased
with the ordinance framed the debate over the merits of the LHD on their own
terms. By gaining the information advantage early on, these owners were able
to shape the beliefs of less informed owners regarding what could and could
not be done under the ordinance. This is best illustrated by the incident
described at the outset of this Note, in which Hallock Avenue owner Tom
Ahern replaced all of his approximately eighty wood windows with vinyl
windows without receiving HDC approval. When the HDC learned of this
unapproved switch, it issued a citation to Ahern for violating the LHD
ordinance. In response, Ahern circulated a neighborhood petition, asking
owners and residents to support his ex post bid to keep the vinyl windows.
After two well-attended formal hearings over the course of two months as well
85. Since the survey data were gathered, the city has created a basic website offering printable
application forms, but the substantive information provided remains relatively sparse. City
of New Haven, Historic Preservation and the Historic District Commission,
http://www.cityofnewhaven.com/CityPlan/HistoricPreservation.asp (last visited Nov. 29,
2006).
86. Specific improvements mentioned by survey respondents included replacing wood windows
with vinyl windows, adding vinyl siding, building decks and porches, and completing
exterior renovations. Many LHD ordinances impose "Interim Protection Provisions" that
regulate the changes that can be made to properties while an area is under consideration for
historic designation, precisely to limit the potential for this type of activity. NAT'L TRUST
FOR HISTORIC PRES., supra note 8, at 5.
87. Younger owners appeared to be particularly vigilant about making repairs and additions
prior to the effective date of the LHD. Thirty percent of young owners reported engaging in
such activities, as opposed to only 8% of middle-aged and older owners combined.
Although not statistically significant (Fisher's Exact = .o95), this differential appears worthy
of further research with a larger sample.
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as informal negotiations between Ahern and the HDC staff, the HDC
permitted Ahern to keep the vinyl windows on the sides of the building as long
as he replaced the front windows with wooden ones.
This incident has been the most significant controversy involving the LHD
to date; nearly every resident referred to it when asked how the LHD had
affected the neighborhood.8" In particular, this incident illustrates two key
ways in which a single owner can step into the information vacuum and shape
the beliefs of fellow owners. First, Tom Ahern's cover letter to fellow residents
stated the following: "The City Point Historic District can be a protective tool
but should not completely impede progress. THE FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH COMMISSION DECISIONS CAN ULTIMATELY RESULT IN
HOMEOWNER ARREST. ' '89 Although the second sentence is factually
incorrect, several relatively less informed owners stated that they were opposed
to the LHD because they were afraid that they could be arrested for making a
genuine mistake in maintaining their homes. Moreover, these owners
frequently mentioned the Ahern petition in conjunction with this fear,
implying that the petition was their source of information on this point.
Second, this incident permitted skeptical owners like Ahern to frame the debate
over the LHD as a debate about the potentially arbitrary nature of individual
HDC decisions (a negative approach), rather than in terms of the need for
equal compliance by all members of the community in order to maintain the
integrity of the LHD (a positive approach). One South Water Street owner
acknowledged that LHD supporters had been placed somewhat on the
defensive by the Ahern incident, and that they were trying to refocus the debate
by emphasizing what they considered to be Ahern's questionable tactics:
[This] guy put in vinyl windows in his house, and then went to ask for
permission .... It's different if you made an honest mistake, and didn't
know -but to go and intentionally flout the regulations and then try to
rally the neighbors against this "injustice" is just wrong.
Regardless of one's opinion of Ahern's strategy, the incident certainly
appears to have influenced the views of uninformed owners, emphasizing the
rights that the LHD takes away and deemphasizing the advantages that the
LHD provides. In sum, on the question of whether those affected by the law
88. Of course, different individuals referenced this incident in different ways. Some
interviewees noted that if a debate over a few windows was the biggest problem that had
arisen in four years, the LHD was largely a success. Others saw the incident as a
premonition of things to come and said that the incident had made them more skeptical of
the value of the LHD.
8g. Letter from Tom Ahern to City Point Residents (Apr. 2004) (on file with author).
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actually know what the law is, this research suggests the answer is an emphatic
no.
C. How Groups Differ in Their Views - "Middle-Class" Versus "Working-
Class" Streets
The survey also revealed differences in opinion when responses were
aggregated and then analyzed according to various independent variables.
Eleven bifurcated groups were constructed from the demographic data: (1)
respondent's age;9" (2) respondent's street; 9 ' (3) respondent's race; 9 (4) year
the home was built (pre- or post-189o, the median year of construction for City
Point); (5) purchase year pre- or post-1995 (the median purchase year of all
owner-occupied homes); (6) purchase year pre- or post-199o (identifying
"old-timers"); (7) purchase year pre- or post-2000 (identifying "newcomers");
(8) 2002 assessed value of the home (above or below the median); (9) square
footage (above or below the median); (io) acreage (above or below the
median); and (ii) presence of multiple units in the dwelling (yes or no). 93
Every survey question was then reanalyzed through the filter of these
demographic variables. Approximately 9o% of the time, these reanalyses
confirmed that there was no statistically significant relationship between the
demographic category and the distribution of responses to a particular survey
question. Yet with respect to the respondent's street, there were numerous
statistically significant differences, including the fact that those living on the
more elegant streets were significantly more favorable toward the LHD and
were less likely to feel that they were bearing a disproportionate burden of
LHD regulations relative to their neighbors.
On the broad question of whether the advantages of the LHD had
outweighed the disadvantages, those living on the historically "middle-class
streets" (MCS) of Howard Avenue, South Water Street, and Sea Street were
go. To construct a bifurcated age variable, three separate age measures were employed: younger
versus (middle + older); middle versus (younger + older); and older versus (middle +
younger). "Younger" was defined as under the age of forty; "middle" as ages forty to sixty-
four; and "older" as over the age of sixty-four.
91. This variable functioned as a proxy for social class. For more detail, see infra note 94 and
accompanying text.
92. Race was identified by visual assessment of the respondent. Due to the relatively small
number of racial minorities in any given ethnic category, this variable was bifurcated as
white versus (black + Latino + mixed-race households).
93. Although wealth and income levels would have been valuable categories to examine directly,
it is difficult to determine accurate wealth and income levels through self-reporting survey
instruments.
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much more favorable toward the LHD than those living on the historically
"working-class streets" (WCS) of Sixth Street, Hallock Avenue, and
Greenwich Avenue. 94 Moreover, MCS respondents were more likely than WCS
respondents to believe that the LHD had increased their home value (78% to
6o%, NMcs=36, Nwcs=15), and less likely to believe that the LHD had
decreased their home value (3% to 13%, NMcs=36, Nwcs=15). Although the
difference was not statistically significant, these data strongly support the
statistically significant finding that MCS respondents were more likely than
WCS respondents to be happy with the effect they believed the LHD had on
their home value (91% to 58%, NMcs=32, Nwcs=12, p < .05). These findings
were not necessarily surprising, considering that as a group, the MCS homes
on Howard Avenue, South Water Street, and Sea Street had both higher
average assessed values 9 and greater average square footage9 6 than did the
homes on Greenwich Avenue, Hallock Avenue, and Sixth Street.
However, a more in-depth examination of the survey data presents a
puzzle. Given that MCS owners had a more favorable impression of the LHD
than did their WCS counterparts, it might logically be expected that MCS
respondents would be more accepting of the rigidity of the LHD standards. It
might also be expected that if MCS owners were already maintaining their
historic homes appropriately (and appreciated the advantages of the LHD in
94. This difference was statistically significant. See supra note 79. Streets were designated as
MCS or WCS on the basis of assessed value per unit and an overall visual assessment. There
were seventy-one total homes in the MCS group, with forty-seven owner-occupiers; of
those owner-occupiers, thirty-six responded to the survey. There were thirty-seven total
homes in the WCS group, with twenty-three owner-occupiers; of those owner occupiers,
fifteen responded to the survey. Appraisal data was derived from Vision Appraisal Tech.,
supra note 75, and compiled in Fall 2004, when this study was conducted. (All appraisal data
are contained in the Excel data file available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/
abstract.asp?id=63o.) The average MCS assessed value per unit using 2004 appraisal data
was $61,38o, whereas the average WCS assessed value per unit was $51,915 (approximately a
15% differential). In New Haven, assessed value is 70% of market value. The visual
assessment incorporated factors including whether the home was built in a distinct high
architectural style, the quality of (and materials used in) exterior home maintenance, the
spatial relationship between homes on a given street, and building placement within the lot.
Representative photographic examples of homes on each of the City Point Streets are
available at http://www.yalelawjoumal.org/abstract.asp?id=63o. While assessed value and
external appearance are admittedly imperfect proxies for income (given that different
individuals do not necessarily allocate their wealth toward housing in similar proportions),
they are the best proxies available, and the representativeness problem inherent in
extrapolating from individual-level data is mitigated somewhat by examining aggregate-
level data (as this survey does).
g5. See Vision Appraisal Tech., supra note 75.
96. According to the Vision Appraisal data, id., the MCS group of homes had an average of 2387
square feet, whereas the WCS group of homes had an average of 191o square feet.
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improving their property values), they would be less concerned than WCS
owners about the cost and effort required to comply with the LHD regulations.
Surprisingly, however, there was no statistically significant difference between
the responses of the two groups concerning the on-the-ground impact of the
LHD. Approximately 6o% of respondents in both groups thought that the
HDC should be more flexible in interpreting LHD regulations (NMcs=35,
Nwcs=14) and that LHD regulations had not substantially changed their own
home maintenance regime (NMcs=35, Nwcs=15). About 25% of both groups
found compliance with LHD regulations to be inexpensive (NMcs=33,
Nwcs=14). (At the other end of the spectrum, only 15% of WCS respondents
found compliance to be expensive, in contrast to 33% of MCS respondents
(NMcs=33, Nwcs=14).) And both MCS and WCS respondents were equally
divided as to whether they were bothered by having to comply with LHD
regulations -approximately one-third of each group were "not bothered," a
third of WCS respondents (and about half of MCS respondents) were
bothered, and the balance of respondents were neutral (NMcs=36, Nwcs=14) .
The answer to this puzzling discrepancy between the overall satisfaction of
MCS and WCS respondents and their nearly indistinguishable complaints
regarding LHD obligations may lie in the statistically significant MCS/WCS
distinction on questions concerning community relations. MCS respondents
were much more likely than WCS respondents to believe that City Point
residents generally had good neighborly relations (97% to 77%, NMcs=36 ,
Nwcs=13); to report that they personally knew their neighbors well (72% to
27%, NMcs=36, Nwcs= 15); to feel comfortable telling neighbors that they might
be violating the LHD regulations (31% to o%, NMcs=36 , Nwcs=lS); to be a
member of the City Point Neighborhood Association (77% to 33%, NMcs=35,
Nwcs=12); and to believe that the neighborhood association had improved the
quality of the neighborhood (63% to 21%, NMcs=35, Nwcs=14).9 8
These data suggest that although both MCS and WCS respondents
expressed similar frustrations with the burdens imposed by the LHD, MCS
respondents were much more confident than WCS respondents that, on an
individual level, they themselves were not bearing the burdens of LHD
compliance disproportionately in relation to their neighbors. LHDs, like other
policies that aim to create significant positive externalities, have the potential
97. See infra app. tbls.i-5. The Appendix is also available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/
abstract.asp?id=6 3o.
98. See infra app. tbls.6-io. All of these differences between MCS and WCS respondents were
statistically significant at p < .05.
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for creating free-riders.99 In the LHD context, free-riders are owners who are
content to let their neighbors bear the costs of restoring historic homes
(thereby increasing the aesthetic and financial value of the neighborhood as a
whole), while doing only the bare minimum to meet LHD standards for their
own homes. The more that any individual owner believes that she is bearing a
disproportionate amount of financial responsibility (relative to her individual
gain) for providing the positive externalities of an aesthetic neighborhood, the
less happy she will be about the prospect of doing so. Conversely, individual
owners who are confident that their neighbors will contribute proportionately
to maintaining the positive externalities created by LHD regulations will be
more likely to accept a requirement that they themselves contribute
proportionately. In short, while the confident owner and the disgruntled
owner may be equally annoyed on an individual level at rigid regulations and
added expenses, the critical distinction is that the confident owner sees an
overall benefit proportional to the cost (primarily in terms of increased
property value), whereas the disgruntled owner may not.
Furthermore, if the ability to minimize free-riders makes an owner
confident as opposed to disgruntled, confident owners are likely to display
characteristics that limit the ability of their neighbors to free-ride. The easiest
way to free-ride is to remain relatively anonymous, thereby avoiding the
obligation to contribute to the common good. In contrast, it is difficult to free-
ride when one's actions are monitored by those with whom one has a set of
mutual relationships and shared social norms. °° Knowing one's neighbors
well, being involved in a neighborhood association that one believes makes a
difference, and feeling confident in speaking to one's neighbors about an
individual action that has communal effects are all indicative of an environment
in which free-riding will be extremely difficult. These are precisely the factors
that distinguished MCS respondents from WCS respondents.'
The other main point of divergence between MCS and WCS respondents
centered on a profound disagreement over precisely what the term "historic"
should mean. For many MCS respondents, the concepts of "historic" and
"aesthetic" converged. The historic homes on these streets - those buildings
that are most crucial to telling the architectural and social history of the City
Point neighborhood, such as its oysterman's houses and its "streetcar suburb"
99. For an overview and explanation of the free-rider problem, see Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure
Theoty of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).
ioo. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1971) (setting forth the
theory that there are qualitative as well as quantitative differences in the ways that small and
large groups operate).
ioi. See infra app. tbls.6-io.
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mansions-are also quite aesthetically pleasing. Moreover, MCS houses that do
not have any overriding historical or architectural significance have still largely
been maintained at a high level of quality, allowing the externalities of these
maintenance regimes to be captured by neighboring owners, who tend to
reciprocate in kind. For these MCS residents, there was no conflict between the
concept of the LHD as a tool that encourages aesthetic improvement, as a tool
that preserves the neighborhood in its pre-2001 state, and as a tool that
provides a desirable increase in property values.
However, these definitions were not as closely aligned in the minds of
WCS respondents. For many WCS residents, there was a distinct tension
between their disinclination (or financial inability) to transform their homes
into the aesthetic gems of Howard Avenue and their desire to ensure that the
neighborhood retained its fundamental character, unencroached upon by
highway expansions or potential new condo developments. For these WCS
residents, the primary value of the LHD was that it assisted in maintaining
some semblance of the neighborhood status quo. Although these residents
appeared to appreciate the positive contribution that the LHD has made to
neighborhood stability, they tended to resent the accompanying aesthetic
obligations, particularly because they did not view their homes as being crucial
contributing elements to the historic nature of City Point. '2 Indeed, many
WCS owners echoed the sentiments of one Sixth Avenue owner, who argued
that protecting and retaining the historic elements of City Point should not
necessarily mean holding all residents to the same high aesthetic standards' 3 :
I'm actually in favor of the district because of the protections it
provides. But at the same time, we shouldn't be trying to create a
museum-there needs to be some middle ground between letting
people do whatever they want, and applying the same standards that
they use for preserving National Historic Landmarks.
Arriving at a common agreement within the City Point community on the
meaning of the LHD was one of the most significant challenges facing the
102. This assertion may seem odd given the data presented infra app. this. 1-5, which show that as
a group, WCS respondents found it easier to comply with the LHD regulations than did
their MCS counterparts. However, it is worth noting that the qualitative evidence suggests
that MCS owners often encountered the LHD regulations as they attempted to make an
already aesthetically pleasing home even more so, whereas WCS owners often encountered
the LHD regulations when they attempted to make more essential changes that often had
little to do (in their minds) with aesthetics.
103. This issue of using a "historic district" designation to pursue essentially aesthetic ends is
discussed in David F. Tipson, Putting the History Back in Historic Preservation, 36 URB. LAW.
289 (2004).
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neighborhood as a whole. Indeed, while approximately 8o% of both MCS and
WCS respondents said they would consider purchasing a $75 "City Point
Historic District" plaque for their homes (NMcs=36, Nwcs=IS), MCS
respondents put their money where their mouth was. While 42% of MCS
respondents reported having purchased a plaque, only 7% of WCS respondents
had done the same (NMcs=28, Nwcs=13). And as one Sea Street owner observed
with only a slight hint of exaggeration, "You can tell pretty easily where people
stand on the historic district- those who have plaques are in favor of it, and
those who don't, aren't."
III. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: MANAGING AND ENFORCING LHD
OBLIGATIONS
This Part examines how City Point owners managed their own LHD
obligations and how they enforced (or declined to enforce) the ordinance in the
event of violations by their fellow owners. Section A demonstrates that while
many LHD owners did follow the HDC regulations -despite their complaints
about the HDC process-some LHD owners sought instead to evade LHD-
associated expenses. This raises the extremely important issue of enforcement:
how the LHD regulations are actually enforced in practice, by whom, and to
what effect, all of which are discussed in Sections B and C. This Part explores
the effectiveness of the three main enforcement options available to address
such evasions: first-party enforcement by the individual owner, second-party
enforcement via neighborhood social norms, and third-party enforcement by
the HDC.
A. Managing One's Own LHD Obligations: First-Party Enforcement
Under the first-party enforcement model, an individual owner will
voluntarily recognize that a particular alteration project requires HDC
approval, will initiate the HDC permitting process, and will not begin work
until all approvals have been finalized. The first-party enforcement model is
the ideal theoretical enforcement model because if owners had full information
and adhered solely to this model, there would be uniform enforcement of the
applicable laws without excess transaction costs. 1°4 The percentage of likely
first-party enforcers in the City Point LHD can be roughly approximated by
looking at the percentage of owners who reported that they were "not
104. These excess transaction costs could come either in the form of unnecessary applications by
owners or in the failure of owners to make applications that should have been made.
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bothered" by complying with the regulations (32%, N=5o). One particularly
striking empirical finding supporting this method of identifying potential first-
party enforcers is the fact that, of the subset of respondents who were "not
bothered" by the need to comply with the LHD regulations, 53% found
compliance "difficult" (N=15). This pattern fits quite well with the concept of
first-party enforcement because the theory would predict that a first-party
enforcer would act out of conviction regarding the value of the act itself, rather
than on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis.
In order to measure first-party enforcement, this study examined whether
the LHD had any effect on the ways in which individual respondents actually
maintained their own properties. In particular, owners were asked whether
they felt that LHD regulations had led them to take better care of their homes
than they would have otherwise; a substantial majority of respondents (9o%,
N=49) said that the regulations had not led them to do so."' Such findings
initially suggest that because few respondents seemed to believe that the LHD
regulations had affected their behavior, few respondents would have found
compliance to be difficult, expensive, or bothersome. Yet a more detailed
examination of the survey results revealed just the opposite, with numerous
respondents complaining about the difficulty, expense, and bother of
compliance.
Looking first at difficulty of compliance, only 33% of respondents found it
was "easy" or "very easy" to comply with the LHD regulations, compared to
67% who found compliance to be either moderately or extremely difficult
(N=4 9 ). Furthermore, while 58% of respondents reported having at least a
moderate amount of knowledge about what the LHD regulations required of
them as homeowners (N=51), there was absolutely no correlation between their
level of knowledge about the regulations and the ease of compliance
(p=.833).' °6
There appear to be three possible explanations for why even those who
knew about the regulations often had difficulty complying with them. First,
owners may simply have known (or heard from others) that obtaining HDC
approval is a time-consuming process and felt that this process itself created
los. Indeed, as was noted supra Section II.A, few respondents had ever even seen the LHD
regulations.
1o6. It should be noted that in answering these particular questions, survey respondents were
reporting their own subjective level of knowledge and perceptions of what constituted
difficulty of compliance, rather than rating these issues on an objective scale. The remainder
of this Section discusses the consequences of the fact that different respondents defined
these terms in different ways.
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difficulties." 7 Second, it is possible that while owners may not have known
how the LHD ordinance operated in close cases, they were aware that the
ordinance would forbid them to knock down exterior walls, install decks, and
engage in other large-scale projects without HDC approval, and therefore
refrained from such activities. Indeed, a significant minority of respondents
(40%, N=5o) acknowledged that they had intentionally forgone making certain
improvements because the LHD was in effect. Some of these improvements -
such as replacing clapboard siding with vinyl -may be legally impossible now
that the LHD is in effect, yet others -such as adding on an addition or a
porch-are merely more difficult. It is therefore possible that owners who do
not know about the specific provisions of the ordinance still have a good
general sense of projects that would indisputably require HDC approval.
Third, this lack of correlation between "level of knowledge" and "ease of
compliance" may indicate that owners were setting a higher compliance bar for
themselves than is legally required. As one South Water Street owner noted,
"[My neighbor has] owned his house for over twenty-five years, and even after
the ordinance passed he thought that he would have to repaint it the color it
was when he bought it!" When owners are uncertain about their precise
obligations under the LHD, °S it appears that many of them overcompensate
by avoiding smaller improvements that might actually be permissible. Indeed,
this is the most likely explanation for the finding that a significant minority of
owners (44%, N=5o) were "bothered" by having to comply with the LHD
regulations, despite the fact that most respondents reported that they did not
know precisely what those regulations entailed.
Turning to the expense of complying with the LHD regulations, a majority
of respondents reported that they found it either somewhat more expensive
(48%) or much more expensive (28%) to maintain their properties post-LHD,
although a smaller percentage (24%) stated that the LHD had not significantly
impacted their budgets (N=46)."9 The qualitative evidence revealed that the
main expenses associated with LHD compliance were the relatively higher costs
of historically appropriate building materials and the administrative costs of
the HDC process. These financial hurdles were viewed as strong compliance
disincentives by many respondents; those on low or fixed incomes frequently
107. For more detail on owner perceptions of the HDC process, see infra Section III.C.
io8. For example, when an owner believes that the New Haven LHD ordinance forbids exterior
repainting or interior renovations - neither of which is actually prohibited.
1o9. This latter finding should be evaluated in the context of the relatively recent passage of the
LHD ordinance. It is quite possible that many respondents have not had to engage in major
repair or maintenance projects and therefore have not experienced the financial implications
of the LHD to the same extent as have some of their neighbors.
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noted that they felt forced to compromise between following the law and being
financially responsible. As one Sea Street resident observed:
We're a blue-collar neighborhood.... There are older people here; they
can't afford to spend $36o on a window. So I'd like to see the
Commission recognize [that] the people who live in these houses want
to do the best they can to comply with the historic district standards,
but can't afford to pay out of their own pocket to make changes that
don't really create a huge aesthetic difference.
The issue of evading expense should also be considered in a discussion of
the expense of meeting LHD requirements. Evasion occurred primarily
through "grandfathering" improvements, because in the several months
between the vote for the LHD and its enactment, the ordinance was imminent
but inoperative. During this time, approximately 13% of respondents took
advantage of the opportunity to make repairs, install vinyl windows or siding,
and engage in exterior renovations.' These owners were therefore able to
avoid both the fees for HDC review and the possibility that the HDC would
reject their improvements as historically inappropriate. Several owners
elaborated upon this point, accentuating the crucial nature of the timing of the
repairs. One South Water Street owner said, "For example, it's easier to
maintain your house with plastic windows, and for those who did it earlier,
they came out ahead." And a Hallock Avenue owner noted, "I know of at least
thirty people who made changes before the district went into effect, and at least
six who made changes afterwards [without going through the HDC process],
because vinyl windows are just better, and they make the cost of heating your
house much less." The law therefore mattered to these owners and influenced
their first-party behavior-but not in the manner that preservation-minded
proponents of the LHD may have desired.
Given the evidence presented in this Section, the majority sentiment that
the LHD regulations had "little effect" on respondents' activities seems unlikely
to reflect accurately the impact of the regulations themselves. Although
respondents may not have had detailed familiarity with the LHD regulations,
many respondents certainly had well-formed perceptions of what the regulations
required them to do. The evidence further suggests that owners tended to act
upon these perceptions -accurate or not-when making decisions about how
to maintain their own homes. In this respect, the existence of the LHD
regulations clearly did have the effect of altering the status quo maintenance
regime of City Point homeowners.
11o. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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B. Community Standards and LHD Regulations: Second-Party Enforcement
Given the practical difficulties of entrusting the provision of a public good
(like an LHD) solely to norms of first-party enforcement, a second-party or
third-party enforcement model might be expected to predominate as the
mechanism for resolving LHD disputes. This Section focuses on second-party
enforcement, defined for these purposes as the enforcement of communal
standards by other members of the community, relying on the community's
own internal social norms rather than on external "third-party" enforcement by
official governmental entities such as the HDC.
1. Neighborhood Relations in City Point
The effectiveness of second-party enforcement in City Point might be
expected to be high because the City Point LHD is so new and because many of
the owners who voted to create the district-and who had longstanding
communal bonds that preceded the vote itself- still live in the community. As
such, it seems likely that these owners would have a stronger conception of
what a violation entails (and how it should be addressed) than owners who
arrived in the district after it had been established. However, while 92% of
respondents (N=49) felt that City Point residents generally had good relations
with their neighbors, and while 78% of respondents (N=5i) felt they knew
their neighbors at least fairly well, a majority of residents (59%, N=5i) reported
that they would feel uncomfortable telling a neighbor that she might be
violating an LHD regulation. This result may suggest that neighborly relations
in City Point are so positive precisely because neighbors actively attempt to
avoid controversies and do not inform one another that they might be violating
the law. Yet one might also imagine that a good neighbor would want to warn
another neighbor before a small potential violation became a major and
expensive one. The information gap might also explain why such a neighborly
warning system might not be evident;"1 if owners are not confident that a
neighbor's activity is actually a violation, they may be reluctant to voice their
concerns. This rationale is bolstered somewhat by the finding that 71% of
owners (N=49) reported that they had at least some trust that their neighbors
would comply voluntarily with the LHD regulations.
However, significant second-party enforcement effects can be created by a
small minority of owners, especially if these owners are particularly vigilant
and vocal. Such effects certainly appeared to be present in City Point; indeed,
iii. See supra Section II.B.
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several owners mentioned-with equal parts admiration and exasperation-
one particular resident who had acquired a reputation as the local second-party
enforcer. According to respondents, this resident engaged in second-party
enforcement by employing a combination of informal gossip about owners
who were not meeting LHD standards, vigilant observation of actual alteration
projects, and the willingness to report stubborn violators to the HDC. In a
neighborhood as small and compact as City Point, second-party enforcement
by a small minority is eminently feasible; however, it also appeared that there
were many LHD supporters who, presumably for reasons of maintaining good
relations with their neighbors, were willing to free-ride quietly on the second-
party enforcement actions of this one individual. Thus, the reputational
consequences of warning resistant neighbors about potential violations were
concentrated in a single individual rather than diffused among neighbors
throughout the district. As one strong LHD supporter admitted:
The woman who is sort of the [neighborhood] head of the historic
district has a reputation for reporting people who violate the
regulations. And now that she's stepping down, some people have
asked if I'd take over. But my wife doesn't want me to take her place
because she's afraid that the neighbors won't like us anymore.
Clearly, there are several problems with the structure of this second-party
enforcement system. For instance, any underlying neighborhood resentment
about LHD enforcement in general may become directed toward one specific
neighbor, who comes to be viewed as part neighbor and part spy. Overreliance
on a single individual also suggests that the neighborhood has not developed a
broader second-party enforcement base. If this base is well developed, one
neighbor who refuses to acquiesce to the second-party warnings of another will
likely face additional pressure from other neighbors, thereby limiting the need
to resort to third-party adjudication. If there is only one "enforcing"
neighbor-and if his or her warning goes unheeded-the only alternative for
that second-party enforcer is to pursue third-party adjudication at the HDC.
The adequacy and desirability of a third-party remedy is discussed further in
Section C.
2. The Informal Violation Enforcement Formula
More evident, however, was the informal neighborhood norm that-
despite the official text of the LHD ordinance -all violations were not deemed
to be equal. Because these owners were largely the same ones who voted for the
LHD ordinance, they generally felt confident in asserting and enforcing their
beliefs about what constituted a violation and what did not, under the
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somewhat tautological rationale that they would not have voted to create a
district that deemed certain marginal improvements to be violations.
It also appeared that owners had developed an informal system for dealing
with potential violations. Under this formula, the level of tolerance for a
violation depended on the extent of the violation- both in scope and in visual
prominence-as measured against the income or wealth level of the violator.
Given this result, a small positive adjustment would then be made if there was
good-faith error or necessity, while a small negative adjustment woid be made
if there was bad faith or if the action was taken for mere convenience. The
comments of many owners supported this theory:
I like the idea of the historic district a lot, but I do think that they need
to be a bit more flexible on things like windows, particularly for some
of the elderly on fixed incomes. Oil is becoming so expensive, and
people really need to be able to save money on their fuel costs, and
making sure you have insulated windows is a big part of that. (Howard
Avenue Owner)
We want things to look nice, but we also need them to be aware that all
of this costs money. There should be differentiated standards-that
houses that are really nice, and could be renovated to a really high
quality by people who have the money to do so, should be held to a
higher standard. (Sea Street Owner)
The result of this formula was that those who could not afford to meet the
letter of the law, but who did the best that they could in good faith, were
unlikely to be reported. Far from being divorced from a concern about other
neighbors' well-being, this informal formula appeared to be viable largely
because of the high levels of neighborliness reported by respondents -without
knowledge of the financial situations of one's neighbors, it would be
impossible to make the calculation with any accuracy.
Moreover, this informal social norm formula also helps explain the varying
community responses to the three types of scenarios in which owners
intentionally evaded LHD regulations. In the first scenario, owners who made
minor alterations often justified their actions by arguing that the burden of
seeking HDC approval was excessive in light of the change that was being
made, or that the alteration was so commonsense that their neighbors would
not be concerned. As one Greenwich Avenue resident noted:
People install things all the time without going to the Commission. For
example, I installed these railings to the front door without the
Commission's approval, because my wife had a stroke and the doctor
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said that we needed railings. I'm not going to the Commission to get
their approval -I just put on the same railings that everyone else on the
street has, because it was a medical necessity.
In this particular situation, the owner made a small improvement, consistent
with other houses on the block, for a reason that other owners deemed to be a
necessity. Although his income was somewhat higher than that of his
neighbors, this factor was not deemed to outweigh the minor nature of the
alteration, even though the alteration was clearly visible from the street.
In the second scenario, owners stated that they followed the LHD
regulations, but did so without actually seeking formal HDC approval. For
example, one Howard Avenue owner noted that although he had replaced a
broken window without seeking HDC approval,
I went and got a nice six-over-one wood window, which was
historically accurate even though it didn't match precisely what I
replaced. And in doing so, I was thinking along the lines of what would
be required by the Commission-so even though I didn't meet the
letter of the regulations, I'm certain that I met the substance of the
regulations.
This scenario did not tend to provoke a second-party enforcement response
from the community, as it appeared that the owner made a relatively minor
and historically accurate alteration and sought to act in good faith and in
accordance with the spirit of the law.
Finally, in the third scenario, owners like Tom Ahern knew that their
improvements or alterations would be unlikely to receive HDC approval if they
applied yet made the changes anyway. In contrast to the first two scenarios, the
third scenario did provoke a second-party response because it concerned a
large-scale violation (numerous windows being replaced) and was conducted
in a manner that many neighbors thought was in bad faith by an owner who
was using the properties for rental income (and therefore presumably had the
ability to pay for wood replacements). Indeed, several owners mentioned that
they warned Tom Ahern that he might be violating the ordinance, yet his
refusal to voluntarily heed the neighborhood social norms made it necessary to
employ a third-party enforcement mechanism.
In sum, it appears that while second-party enforcement does exist in City
Point, it is frequently employed in a more nuanced manner than might initially
have been expected.
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C. The Role of the Historic District Commission: Third-Party Enforcement
This Note has demonstrated that many City Point owners were willing to
ignore or attempt to evade the HDC in certain circumstances. Notably, while
most survey respondents felt that the HDC had extremely good intentions,
many also felt that the unintended consequences of HDC policies often
hindered the very preservation goals that the HDC process was designed to
foster. The survey highlighted three main barriers to the HDC's becoming a
truly effective third-party enforcement mechanism for LHD disputes: the costs
associated with HDC review, the absence of dearly delineated safe harbors, and
the perceived failure of the HDC to adequately understand or accommodate
local needs. In particular, 59% of respondents stated that they had found the
HDC to have been "rigid" in its interpretation of the LHD regulations, while
only 6% believed that the HDC had been "flexible" (N=4 9 ). When asked how
they felt the HDC should operate, 63% of respondents felt that the HDC should
be "more flexible" in interpreting the LHD regulations, whereas only 12% felt
that the HDC should be "more rigid" (N=49). This Section therefore seeks to
determine why these owners displayed resistance to cooperating with the very
institution that not only had the legal power to govern their actions, but was
also the most effective third-party mechanism for enforcing the regulations
that the owners themselves voted overwhelmingly to adopt.
1. Participant Costs in Time and Resources
The first barrier to the HDC's effectiveness as a third-party enforcement
mechanism was the cost associated with pursuing and receiving HDC
approval. Notably, the respondents who raised concerns about cost were not
strictly - or even mostly - expressing a complaint about the application fee per
se. Certainly, several respondents complained that because of the flat fee, the
financial cost of seeking HDC approval could often constitute a large
percentage of the cost of a relatively small project, such as replacing a single
window. Indeed, several respondents complained of "having to pay $8o simply
to ask a question." Yet most respondents understood that the fiscal realities of
underfunded local government entities might necessitate such fees. What was
more troubling to respondents was that the HDC fee created a disincentive for
compliance. As one respondent noted, owners who could not afford the fee
would often simply avoid the HDC process entirely:
One big problem is that it costs money to ask a question-and that's a
bad incentive. For example, my neighbor does whatever he wants, since
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he doesn't want to pay the money, and he's pretty sure that no one is
going to complain. (South Water Street Owner)
Several respondents also noted that the structure of the fee schedule often
created disincentives even for those owners who did want to comply with the
HDC. In particular, many owners were exasperated that the fees were charged
on a per-appearance, rather than per-project, basis; these owners argued that
they began the process in good faith yet found themselves paying multiple fees
to receive approval. As one owner recounted:
I went to the HDC because I wanted to put a deck on, and I paid the
$75, and they approved everything and then asked me to make one
change. So I made the change, and then they asked me to pay another
$75 to approve it. And I told them "you're just increasing the incentives
for people not to go to the Commission." This kind of a policy seems to
defeat the whole purpose of the district. (Sea Street Owner)
This concern about the de facto multiphase process for HDC approvals was
shared by other respondents for a related reason: the length of time that it
often took to receive the final HDC approval. Many respondents felt that the
HDC approval process seemed ill suited to the actual needs of homeowners
who wanted to make rapid repairs. For example, one South Water Street
respondent recounted the stress of making seven successive trips to the HDC
to seek approval to repair a porch that was in danger of collapse, and her
reluctance to take any interim emergency measures due to her fear of being
fined. In short, many well-intentioned owners felt blindsided by what they
perceived as unnecessary delays and charges.
More troubling, however, are the potential long-term consequences of
these negative interactions for the community as a whole. Homeowners in
LHDs are repeat players in their relationships with the HDC, as it is extremely
likely that, over time, they will want to make multiple home improvements
that will require HDC approval. The HDC automatically begins at a
disadvantage in such situations because the homeowner is concerned not only
with historic preservation and aesthetics, but also with the practical realities of
replacing drafty windows or fixing crumbling masonry. In deciding whether or
not to seek approval from the HDC, rational repeat-player owners will
incorporate their previous interactions with the HDC into their informal
calculus. If these previous interactions were positive, it is likely that owners will
be positively (or at least neutrally) disposed toward a repeat interaction.
If, however, the first interaction was a good-faith attempt by the owner to
comply with the regulations, yet the owner felt that the HDC did not
reciprocate with equally good-faith responses, the community as a whole may
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lose on two fronts in the long term -even if the owner is required to adhere to
the letter of the LHD regulations in the short term. First, a negative experience
makes it less likely that this particular owner, disenchanted by his initial
experience, will seek HDC approval on subsequent occasions if he can possibly
avoid doing so. Second, this owner may refrain from complaining about a
neighbor who has committed an LHD violation, knowing that the neighbor
may have to face a similar ordeal before the HDC. Both of these results serve to
weaken the authority of the HDC over the long term, a result that is ultimately
detrimental to the LHD as a whole.
2. The Absence of Clearly Delineated Safe Harbors
The second barrier to the effectiveness of the HDC as a third-party
enforcement mechanism was the absence of clearly delineated safe harbors." 2
Several respondents stated that the absence of safe harbors created substantial
uncertainty among residents as to whether any given proposal would receive
rapid approval by the HDC. As one Howard Avenue resident stated, "No one
actually knows what the Commission will accept or reject. You'd think that
they'd send you the regulations when you buy a house in a historic district, so
you knew where you stood - or have a website with up-to-date guidelines - but
they don't.""3 Furthermore, respondents felt the absence of documented safe
harbors meant that the HDC started every proceeding "from scratch," rather
than by considering its disposition of previous similar requests. Indeed, many
interviewees believed that this de novo approach both increased the delays
associated with receiving approvals and contributed to a sense of arbitrariness
in the Commission's decisions:
Part of the problem is that we're not exactly sure what the Commission
will allow and what it won't, because there haven't been that many
situations in which people have made formal requests.... I'd like to
112. In this context, safe harbor provisions would consist of a certain set of HDC-approved
alterations that an applicant could make without full HDC review. For example, the HDC
could waive the need for a full hearing if the proposed alteration was to replace non-wood
siding with wood siding of the same color on a pre-194o building. Any owner who sought
to make this change could do so simply by notifying the HDC of her intent, rather than
spending the time and money to go through the HDC approval process.
113. While the HDC has recently produced a pamphlet outlining various actions that would
require HDC approval, its examples are illustrative rather than comprehensive. CITY OF NEw
HAVEN, LOCAL HISTORIC DISTpiCTs IN NEw HAVEN 3, http://www.cityofnewhaven.con/
CityPlan/pdfs/HistoricPreservation/LocalHistoricDistricts.pdf (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
While this list provides useful examples for some clear-cut situations, there are still
significant gray areas left to HDC discretion.
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renovate the attic-but I'd also like to put in dormer windows, and I'm
not sure if the Commission is going to approve them. (South Water
Street Owner)
The adverse impact of this problem upon the HDC's effectiveness is
twofold. First, if local homeowners are uncertain about whether a proposed
change will receive rapid approval or face innumerable delays, many may take
the risk of opting out of the review process entirely. (Alternatively, owners
might take the "Ahern position" that it is easier to beg for forgiveness than to
ask permission.) The second problem is more subtle but no less important. By
requiring all proposed alterations to undergo HDC review, the HDC not only
guards against undesirable alterations (from a historic preservation perspective),
but it also raises the costs for those who wish to make desirable alterations. By
failing to identify safe harbors, the HDC is forced to use the same blunt tool of
full review to manage two very different situations. The consequence of this
approach is that, paradoxically, owners who might otherwise engage in
alterations that would increase the historic or aesthetic value of the
neighborhood may be dissuaded from doing so, due to the uncertainty
engendered by the very review process that is supposed to encourage such
activities.
3. The Failure To Demonstrate Responsiveness to Local Needs
The third barrier to the effectiveness of the HDC as a third-party
enforcement mechanism was the sense among respondents that the HDC often
failed to demonstrate responsiveness to the local needs of City Point
homeowners. As noted in Part II, historic preservation policies that worked
well in governing affluent and aesthetic historic districts may not meet the
needs of the new generation of historic districts - those that encompass average
homes owned by people of average means. While the 2002 median home value
in all three New Haven LHDs was higher than the citywide median, there was
also a substantial difference in median home value between Wooster Square,
the city's most elegant (and earliest) LHD, and the more recent vernacular City
Point and Quinnipiac LHDs.114 At present, City Point homeowners have more
in common with the average New Haven homeowner than they do with
Wooster Square homeowners, yet they felt that the HDC was designed to deal
more with the latter than the former.
One common refrain from respondents was a plea for the HDC to strike a
balance between its preservation goals and the practical burden that strict
114. CITY OF NEW HAVEN, supra note 57, at IV.io.
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compliance placed on some (well-meaning) owners. As one Greenwich Avenue
owner complained, "For people who are on a budget, they could use the money
they'd be spending on [historic] windows to help keep up the rest of their
house, and make sure that the entire house looks better." Respondents also felt
that the HDC process was not designed to encourage owner participation or to
assist owners in meeting their obligations, despite the fact that the HDC was
exercising its jurisdiction because of the express invitation of the owners
themselves. One Sea Street owner noted:
I wouldn't mind if the [HDC fee] went to help people in the community
learn about preservation, but I have a sense that it just goes to the
Commission and the city-and that doesn't leave anyone here [in the
community] any better off than they were before in terms of learning
either how to care for their homes or how to avoid making the same
mistakes in their own [HDC] applications.
Several respondents offered other examples of how the existing HDC
process created unnecessary distance between owners and the HDC. Some
noted that holding the formal HDC monthly meetings at City Hall (several
miles from City Point) discouraged community participation, particularly
among those who found it difficult to attend such meetings due to
transportation limitations or childcare needs. Others, such as this South Water
Street owner, pointed out that the "formal hearing" could be intimidating for
owners who were unfamiliar with either government proceedings in general or
the terminology of historic preservation in particular:
When I went to the [Commission] for the first time, I just didn't
"speak their language," and my request was denied. So I went and
spoke with my neighbor, who had some experience with this kind of
thing, and she reworked the language of my application-for the same
proposal-and it was approved. It's that she spoke the language they
needed to hear, with the right keywords, and I didn't. So I was lucky,
but not everyone has an advocate like that.
In short, many respondents seemed to feel that the HDC was designed for
those who had knowledge of historic preservation, experience with the political
system, and the money necessary to implement the best solution (rather than
merely the most affordable one). This is almost certainly not the image that the
HDC sought to convey, yet to at least some owners, these were the messages
that the current HDC structure did convey. By failing to disabuse skeptical
LHD owners of these notions, the HDC inadvertently undermined its own
legitimacy among those who could most benefit from its expertise.
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The evidence presented in this Section should not be construed as
suggesting that the HDC is unimportant. Indeed, the HDC fills an extremely
important role as a third-party enforcement mechanism, particularly because
its experience in reviewing historic preservation alterations provides a level of
consistency and continuity that can be lacking in first- and second-party
enforcement. Nor is this evidence meant to suggest that respondents did not
empathize with the inherent limitations faced by a volunteer part-time
governmental body with extremely limited resources. What the evidence
presented here does suggest is that some of the theoretical advantages of the
HDC process were compromised by what City Point residents viewed as the
practical disadvantages. Although the current process may work well for the
majority of LHD residents, the 4.4% of residents who suggested that they were
"bothered" by having to comply with the regulations will be crucial in
determining the relative success or failure of the LHD over the long run.
Finally, while many of the residents' comments recounted in this Section may
be either technically or legally inaccurate, such factual issues are almost beside
the point. Accurate or inaccurate, these are the perceptions of owners in City
Point, and the HDC must work to correct these perceptions if it is to become
the truly effective third-party enforcement mechanism that is necessary for the
long-term success of the City Point LHD.
IV. DISCUSSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This Part places the empirical case study evidence in the broader legal
policy context, providing both conclusions about the initial experiences of City
Point LHD owners and policy recommendations for improving the
effectiveness of the LHD in the future. By identifying the general policy lessons
of the City Point LHD, this Part seeks to provide insights that will help New
Haven and other cities in their efforts to both improve their LHDs and
preserve their vernacular built environments.
A. Has the City Point LHD Been a Success?
Overall, the short answer is yes. This research found that a majority of
respondents supported the LHD at its creation, felt that the advantages of the
LHD continued to outweigh its disadvantages, and believed that the quality of
life in City Point ten years from now would be worse if the LHD were not in
place." 5 While only a plurality of respondents felt more favorably toward the
115. See supra Section II.A.
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LHD than they did at the time of the vote in 2000, very few respondents felt
less favorably toward the LHD. Indeed, most respondents believed that the
LHD increased their home values and brought stability to a neighborhood that
was in danger of falling into a cycle of higher crime and lower owner-
occupancy rates." 6
However, the lesson for historic preservationists in the City Point
experience is that few respondents saw historic preservation per se as the
primary advantage of the LHD 17 Instead, respondents appeared to be
following William Fischel's "homevoter hypothesis," approving programs that
they believed would increase home values and bring stability to their
neighborhood, regardless of the program's other intrinsic merits., 8 This
finding has two implications for preservationists seeking to increase the
prevalence of vernacular LHDs. First, preservationists need to recognize that
although homevoters may be as eager as traditional preservationists to receive
the fiscal benefits of preservation policies, homevoters are likely to be much
less understanding of the aesthetic restrictions that accompany the benefits
than are their traditional counterparts. Second, preservationists should
nevertheless recognize that this homevoter tendency offers significant
advantages in efforts to increase the number of LHDs. Preservationists have
primarily promoted LHDs by employing arguments about history and
aesthetics, while mentioning the financial advantages (such as preservation tax
credits) only as ancillary benefits. Yet given the increasing evidence connecting
historic preservation to increased home values and neighborhood stability,1 9
preservationists should strongly consider emphasizing the economic benefits of
historic preservation when targeting homevoter neighborhoods like City
Point.2 '
116. Numerous studies indicate that historic designation tends to increase home values,
particularly if the designation is of a historic district rather than of a single property. See,
e.g., Robin M. Leichenko et al., Historic Preservation and Residential Property Values: An
Analysis of Texas Cities, 38 URB. STUD. 1973, 1976 (2001) (noting that of fourteen studies
surveyed, seven showed a positive impact of designation, five showed a neutral or mixed
impact, and only two (both conducted in Philadelphia in 1994 by Paul Asabere and co-
authors) showed a negative impact).
117. See supra Section II.A.
ii8. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: How HOME VALUES INFLUENCE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 4 (2001)
(arguing that homevoters "balance the benefits of local policies against the costs when the
policies affect the value of their home, and they will tend to choose those policies that
preserve or increase the value of their homes").
119. See, e.g., Leichenko et al., supra note 116.
12o. For an excellent analysis of the soundness of such an approach, see DONOVAN D. RYPKEMA,
THE ECONOMICS OF HISTORIC PRESERVATION: A COMMUNITY LEADER'S GUIDE (2d ed. 2005).
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B. Solving the Dilemma of the "Working-Class" Streets
Another significant finding of this research was the difference in attitudes
toward the LHD expressed by those who lived on middle-class streets as
opposed to those who lived on working-class streets. MCS respondents were
consistently more favorable in their assessments of the LHD than were WCS
respondents, and it appeared that this differential was partially explained by
the significantly higher levels of community involvement and neighborly trust
present among MCS respondents.' 2' The key policy issue raised by this finding
is how to solve what might colloquially be termed the "WCS dilemma"-that
is, determining how to design an LHD to encourage participation from owners
in all parts of the LHD and avoid alienating owners whose homes might not be
historic or architectural gems.
It seems that this policy issue has the greatest potential to arise when either
HDCs or preservationists make the tacit presumption (almost certainly
unwittingly) that because the buildings in the LHD share a common historical
context, there is likely substantial homogeneity among the homeowners as
well. While this distinction may be irrelevant for the more "traditionally
historic" LHDs (where the majority of homes are owned by preservation-
minded owners), the discrepancy is clearly evident in an LHD like City Point,
where although the homes may be similar, the homeowners are not. As historic
preservationists increasingly target ordinary neighborhoods for preservation,
they should reevaluate the existing model of LHD design to address-or at
least acknowledge- this dilemma. While this problem presents no easy
answers and is worthy of future targeted research, one policy option would be
to set the HDC review fee on a sliding scale based on a percentage of the
assessed home value, with an absolute cap at a certain point. Although assessed
value is admittedly only a rough proxy for wealth, such a sliding scale might
help encourage WCS owners to participate more fully in the LHD.
C. Do Policy Instruments Matter?
One major question posed by this research was the extent to which formal
historic preservation policy instruments (like LHDs) actually matter in
practice. This Note suggests that there are two answers, depending upon the
use to which the policy instrument is put. First, it appears that for fighting
other "definable policy instruments," such as governmental highway expansion
plans or condo development proposals, a formal policy instrument like the
121. See supra Section II.C.
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LHD can be of significant value. For example, although the City Point LHD
may be of limited legal value in fighting the highway expansion or the condo
development, the LHD certainly provides a strong symbolic statement to
potential adversaries that the residents of the neighborhood are serious and
organized in the face of external threats.'22
Second, this research suggests that although formal policy instruments may
send general signals to local owners about what they can and cannot do with
their property, the practical enforcement of the LHD regulations can depend
significantly on the informal community norms that have developed as a result
of preexisting neighbor and community relations.'23  Indeed, while
respondents' home maintenance regimes were almost certainly influenced by
the presence of the LHD ordinance, this influence was based upon a general
perception of the ordinance rather than its actual text.'24 Moreover, this
research found that respondents had created their own informal formula for
determining when a technical LHD violation would trigger second- or third-
party enforcement mechanisms and that this formula was designed to be more
responsive to local community factors, neighborliness, and notions of
reciprocity than a literal interpretation of the statute would be. 2 s While the
HDC presumably has some limited equitable discretionary authority to take
these "informal" factors into account,2 6 the formal "Application for Certificate
of Appropriateness"' 7 that forms the basis of an owner's petition to the HDC
asks only for photographs, drawings, and plans.
These results are consistent with Robert Ellickson's research on the
interplay between law and social norms. In City Point, the threat of reporting
an LHD violator to the HDC was certainly employed for the purposes of
"invigorat[ing] informal control. "112s However, citizens who had strong
communal bonds with their neighbors also tended to try and reduce their
122. See supra Section I.D.
123. Because this case study was limited to the City Point LHD and the New Haven HDC, it is
certainly possible that HDCs in other cities have been more successful at engaging with
LHD owners and residents and in enforcing their respective ordinances. It would be
exceptionally valuable for future researchers to test the conclusions presented here in the
context of other HDCs.
124. See supra Section III.A.
125. See supra Sections III.B-C.
126. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
127. New Haven Historic Dist. Comm'n, Application for Certificate of Appropriateness, http://
www.cityofnewhaven.com/CityPan/pdfs/HistoricPreservation/ApplicationCertificatofApp
rop112005.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).
1z8. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETrLE DISPUTES 280-86
(1991).
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transaction costs by engaging in negotiations that allowed them to avoid
formal third-party adjudication whenever possible. 29 The broader lesson for
preservationists appears to be that in order to maximize the long-term success
of an LHD, the focus should be on developing strategies for actively increasing
and sustaining first- and second-party enforcement. The more common (and
less expensive) strategy is for a small yet dedicated minority to push for a broad
general policy that can then be enforced through third-party means. However,
this research found that such an approach does little to engage actively the
majority of owners who are critical to the success of an endeavor that relies so
much on broad community participation. These empirical findings suggest
that the long-term success of an LHD likely requires seeking out existing
neighborhood organizations and tailoring each LHD to take advantage of the
strengths of these community groups. In City Point, this might entail forging a
relationship with the students and faculty of the two schools located in the
neighborhood or organizing "field workshops" in collaboration with the
existing neighborhood association to provide owners with hands-on advice for
how to conduct basic home maintenance in a preservation-friendly manner.
D. Improving the HDC Process and Structure
Even in a system with strong first- and second-party enforcement
mechanisms, it is still necessary to have a third-party mechanism for issuing
legal sanctions should other methods fail. Indeed, even when a neighborhood
demonstrates strong initial support for the concept of an LHD, this research
suggests that the practical realities of LHD obligations set in quickly among
owners, requiring an entity like the HDC to maintain the standards of the
LHD in the absence of complete internal enforcement. This research also found
that in the context of an "ordinary" neighborhood LHD like City Point, owners
frequently attempted to circumvent the HDC process -thereby defeating the
very preservation goals that the review process was designed to foster. Thus,
although the HDC system may work quite well for obviously historic
neighborhoods in which self-enforcement levels are often quite high, 3' it is not
ideally structured to address situations in which owners are either less
intrinsically preservation-minded or less able to afford the time and resources
that the HDC approval process requires.131 If a primary goal of preservationists
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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is to ensure the preservation of local neighborhoods, HDC processes must be
oriented toward the latter type of owners as well as the former.
Fortunately, this research suggests several policies that could make the
HDC more responsive to the needs of its changing constituency. First, there is
a significant demand for better communication between the HDC and LHD
homeowners. This study found that very few respondents felt that they had
enough information about the LHD at the time they voted on it and that only a
minority of owners felt that they currently knew enough about what the LHD
regulations required. Furthermore, the absence of official information created
an information vacuum,132 enabling those who sought greater leniency in LHD
enforcement to shape the perceptions of the LHD in the minds of their
neighbors. To remedy this deficiency, the HDC should ensure that every
homeowner receives a copy of the LHD ordinance. The HDC should also
expand its website to include a step-by-step guide to the HDC review process,
a detailed explanatory example of a model application, and a clarification of the
fee schedule to indicate when a single project may be subject to a multiple-
submission fee. Given that a sizeable minority of homeowners in City Point
and other New Haven LHDs are native Spanish speakers, the HDC should
offer each of these services in Spanish as well as in English.
Second, the HDC should attempt to provide applicants with more support
in the review process. One possibility would be to authorize a member of the
City Plan staff to review and approve a category of actions classified by the
HDC as "minor," with referrals to the full HDC only when the staff finds the
proposal has the potential to be contrary to the ordinance. An alternative would
be to permit the HDC to utilize subcommittees for minor reviews, allowing the
full HDC to focus only on potentially controversial proposals. A more radical
proposal in this vein would be for the HDC to develop safe harbor provisions
beyond the current like-for-like standard,'33 which would allow homeowners to
make certain alterations without a full review. Under such a provision, the
default presumption of HDC scrutiny would be reversed, with the burden
placed on the HDC to demonstrate why the change should not be made (rather
than on the owner to demonstrate why it should be). The HDC would then set
forth a hierarchy of building materials in which any move up the hierarchy
would be presumptively allowed and could be made by the owner without a fee
(or for a reduced fee). For example, the safe harbor could permit asbestos-
shingle siding or vinyl siding to be replaced by wooden siding, or vinyl
windows to be replaced by wooden windows.
132. See City of New Haven, supra note 85.
133. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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The HDC could also create a neighborhood "pattern book" with visual
illustrations of presumptively acceptable options for certain alterations. This
book would enable owners to draw upon existing templates rather than face
the uncertainty that their proposed alteration might require multiple trips to
the HDC for approval. Such provisions would not only make more efficient use
of HDC time, they would also encourage homeowners who wished to make
their properties more "historic" (by replacing nonhistoric components with
historic materials) to engage in such repairs without being discouraged by the
delays inherent in the current HDC review process.
Third, the HDC should widen its focus by emphasizing proactive
assistance in addition to reactive adjudication. This research found that many
owners harbored trepidation about the HDC review process, largely because
they were unsure whether any given project was likely to receive approval.
While increased information would mitigate this problem, so too would the
possibility of a prereview consultation, in which homeowners could receive
preliminary feedback about their application while it was still in a conceptual
stage. Such services could be provided through a partnership agreement with
the nonprofit New Haven Preservation Trust, or by existing HDC staff (who
are full-time employees of the New Haven City Plan Department and are
assigned only part-time to HDC duties). By drawing on these existing
resources, it would be quite possible to keep the costs of such prereview
consultations to a minimum and to avoid passing such costs on to the owners.
Providing owners with the option of receiving a preliminary advisory opinion
would also encourage owners to view the HDC process as a collaborative
endeavor, rather than as a potentially adversarial high-stakes hurdle that needs
to be overcome in a single leap. Proactive assistance could also reap significant
benefits in the promotion of state and federal rehabilitation tax credit
programs. The fact that few respondents had ever heard of such programs, and
that even fewer had taken advantage of them, suggests that the HDC is not
assisting LHD owners in obtaining the tax incentives that might encourage
greater voluntary compliance with LHD regulations.13 4
In summary, historic preservationists should work to ensure that
homeowners are knowledgeable about the review processes of their local HDCs
as well as about the benefits that are available to LHD owners. As the main
local governmental entity in charge of preservation, the HDC has an extremely
important role in encouraging voluntary compliance, particularly in
neighborhoods like City Point where owners may not necessarily be inclined to
comply. By demystifying the review process, ensuring the provision of
134. See supra Section Il.B.
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complete information, and providing proactive assistance to owners, the HDC
can reduce its own adjudicative workload while increasing the likelihood of
successful preservation.
E. Recognizing "First-Generation" Issues
Finally, this Note suggests that new LHDs may face unique issues due to
the presence of first-generation LHD owners (i.e., those who resided in the
district prior to its creation), which differ from the issues facing more
established LHDs. In particular, the qualitative evidence suggested that first
generation City Point owner-voters appeared quite confident in setting their
own social norms and standards regarding LHD enforcement-indeed, many
owner-voters stated in interviews that they "knew what they meant" by
"historic district" because they were the ones who sought (and voted) to have it
designated as such.' Because a full exploration of this issue would require
comparative research of multiple LHDs of different ages, it is beyond the scope
of this Note. However, this Note provides preliminary evidence that the
perceptions of "first-generation" owners may differ substantively from those of
subsequent generations of owners, given that the latter move into an already-
designated district and may be more deferential to the official textual statement
defining the rules of the LHD.
The key policy point is that an LHD with a substantial proportion of first-
generation owners appears to require a different approach from local
government and local preservationists than does an established LHD. For
instance, it might be prudent to waive the fee for each owner-voter's first HDC
application to encourage owners to participate in the process and learn how the
HDC interprets what is meant by a "historic district." This "training wheels"
approach would allow owners to learn about the role of LHD regulations in a
less adversarial context and might help diffuse any frustration resulting from a
disparity between the owners' beliefs and the way the HDC implements the
regulations in practice. For City Point, however, the HDC did not take any
steps suggesting that it recognized that LHDs in different stages may have
different needs. Because treating new and old LHDs in the same manner may
not lead to the optimal level of support and preservation over the long term,
policymakers must commit themselves to seeking dynamic policy solutions
that can accommodate LHDs in various stages of development.
135. See supra Subsection III.B.2.
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Historic preservation is no longer a policy whose reach is confined to
birthplaces of the famous, grand public buildings, and elegant suburbs.
Increasingly, historic preservation is focusing on preserving ordinary
communities-communities whose stories were frequently lost in the quest for
urban renewal and whose survival today offers a unique window into the
American past. Yet while the historic preservation movement has expanded in
this new direction, there has been no empirical research on how these
communities and their homeowners have reacted to this development. This
Note fills that gap in the empirical literature by examining how owner-
occupiers in New Haven's City Point Local Historic District viewed,
negotiated, and managed their obligations under a relatively recently approved
LHD ordinance. It is hoped that the empirical results and policy
recommendations presented above will assist local governments, homeowners,
and preservationists alike in balancing the preservation of the past, the needs of
the present, and the inheritance of the future.
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APPENDIX
Table i.
HOW RIGID OR FLEXIBLE THE HDC SHOULD BE IN INTERPRETING LHD REGULATIONS
(N=49)
WCS Respondents 21.4 21.4 57.1
MCS Respondents 8.6 25.7 65.7
Differences between WCS and MCS respondents in Tables i through 5 were not
statistically significant.
Table 2.
HOW MUCH THE LHD REGULATIONS CHANGED THE RESPONDENT'S HOME
MAINTENANCE (N=50)
WCS Respondents 6o.o 13.3 26.7
,MCS Respondents 62.9 11.4 25.7
Table 3.
PERCEIVED EASE OR DIFFICULTY OF COMPLYING WITH LHD REGULATIONS (N=49)
WCS Respondents 42.9 28.6 28.6
MCS Respondents 28.6 51-4 20.0
Table 4.
PERCEIVED EXPENSE OF COMPLIANCE COMPARED TO PRIOR MAINTENANCE COSTS
(N=47)
WCS Respondents 23.1 61.5 15.4
MCS Respondents 24.2 42.4 33.3
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HOW MUCH IT BOTHERED THE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH LHD REGULATIONS
(N=50)
WCS Respondents 28.6 35.7 35-7
MCS Respondents 33.3 19.4 47.2
Table 6.
OPINION ABOUT WHETHER CITY POINT RESIDENTS GENERALLY HAVE GOOD RELATIONS
WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS (N=49)
WCS Respondents 76.9 23.1
MCS Respondents 97.2 2.8
Differences between WCS and MCS respondents were statistically significant: chi-
square = 5.2, p < .05.
Table 7.
HOW WELL THE RESPONDENT KNEW HIS OR HER NEIGHBORS (N=51)
NOT WEL -.. =,(%) -NEUTL (%) L L-(%)-[
WCS Respondents 66.7 6.7 26.7
MCS Respondents 2.8 25.0 72.2
Differences between WCS and MCS respondents were statistically significant: Mann-
Whitney z = -3.9, p < .o5.
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Table 8.
RESPONDENT'S LEVEL OF COMFORT IN TELLING NEIGHBORS THEY WERE NOT IN
COMPLIANCE WITH LHD REGULATIONS (N=51)
U COF. ,L NIE, COMFORTABL (%)
WCS Respondents 73.3 26.7 0.0
MCS Respondents 52.8 16.7 30.6
Differences between WCS and MCS respondents were statistically significant: Mann-
Whitney z = -1.8, p < .o5.
Table 9.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT WAS A MEMBER OF THE CITY POINT NEIGHBORHOOD
ASSOCIATION (N=47)
WCS Respondents 33.3 66.7
MCS Respondents 77.1 22.9...
Differences between WCS and MCS respondents were statistically significant: chi-
square = 7.6, p < .05.
Table io.
PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION IN IMPROVING THE
QUALITY OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD (N=49)
WCS Respondents 28.8 50.0 21.4
MCS Respondents 17.1 20.0 62.9
Differences between WCS and MCS respondents were statistically significant: Mann-
Whitney z = -2.3, p < .05.
822
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1 16:76 8 2007
I~l
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
